

What Jobs Do Workers Want? Worker Preferences in Global Value Chains

British Journal of Industrial Relations

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31 July 2026

What do workers in global value chains (GVCs) consider a good job? Research on work in GVCs largely studies compliance with standards set from the top-down rather than worker preferences. Understanding worker preferences is crucial because workers are the intended beneficiaries of governance institutions; policies better aligned to their preferences could enjoy greater legitimacy and effectiveness. To explore what GVC workers want, we embedded an experiment in an original survey of 2,500 workers in 50 formal Moroccan apparel factories integrated into GVCs. These workers highly valued jobs with characteristics that reduced their exposure to physical risks and provided job stability. They also had strong preferences for jobs with supervisors that treated workers respectfully. By contrast, worker preferences for wage increases available in the Moroccan context were weak, especially when compared with non-wage features. Our results suggest that when wages are compressed and extended working hours is the main way to increase earnings, preferences for non-wage attributes may dominate. We also find more similarities than differences between men and women workers; although women place greater value on respectful supervision, safety, and childcare benefits, their overall preferences closely track those of men. These findings provide novel evidence to inform efforts to improve jobs in GVCs.

Acknowledgments: We thank the factories in Morocco that participated in the survey, the survey team based in Casablanca, and colleagues at Inditex for enabling access. Funding for this project was provided by the University of Oxford, Saïd Business School Faculty Research, and University of Toronto.

1 Introduction

What do workers in global value chains (GVCs) consider a good job? Research on labor in GVCs has focused primarily on compliance with international standards, largely assuming that standards mirror worker preferences (Locke, Amengual, and Mangla 2009, Oka 2016, Short, Toffel, and Hugill 2020, Locke 2013, Kuruvilla 2021, Distelhorst et al. 2015). Yet there are contrasting views of the job attributes that workers in GVCs value and prioritize. Some argue that workers prioritize income (Li and Kuruvilla 2023), while others contend that workers value non-wage attributes such as safety (Kabeer, Haq, and Sulaiman 2019), and still others suggest workers prefer to avoid high-stress environments (De Neve 2014). Often claims about worker preferences are implicit, with studies seeking to understand what processes can alleviate or enhance workplace attributes that they assume workers value.

Surprisingly little empirical work directly investigates GVC worker preferences—two recent exceptions are Li and Kuruvilla (2023) and Kabeer, Haq, and Sulaiman (2019)—leaving many unanswered questions. How do preferences for job attributes like workplace safety, work pace, job stability, and others compare to one another? Do preferences for earnings dominate the other job attributes? To what extent do the priorities of women and men diverge? These questions are important because workers are the primary intended beneficiaries of global labor governance; aligning governance institutions with the preferences of workers might increase both their legitimacy and effectiveness. Moreover, workers have agency that can influence labor markets and the functioning of regulatory institutions. For example, a worker preference for workplace safety would create an incentive for employers to provide such jobs, as it would help attract employees. By contrast, if workers prefer jobs with slightly higher wages to those that are safer, employers may have incentives to reallocate resources away from safety to pay higher wages.

This study examines the preferences of workers in formal Moroccan apparel factories that are integrated into GVCs, seeking to open up debates on what GVC workers want. We fielded a conjoint experiment in a face-to-face survey of approximately 2,500 workers from 50 factories. The experiment described pairs of jobs that randomly varied across a number of job attributes, including wages, hours, employment stability, safety, work environment, benefits, work intensity, and interpersonal respect. The features were selected based on prior literature and semi-structured worker interviews. In total, workers evaluated 14,446 hypothetical job profiles, indicating which they found more desirable. These data allow us to estimate and compare worker preferences for

diverse job attributes.

This analysis of the preferences of workers employed in firms that participate in GVCs yields four contributions to the literature on labor in GVCs. First, we find that workers have strong preferences for workplace safety and job stability—suggesting an alignment between worker concerns and global standards that reduce risks. This finding implies that worker preferences reinforce global regulatory institutions by giving firms that provide protections an advantage in hiring. Second, the experiment revealed that workers have strong preferences for respectful supervisors, showing the importance of interpersonal respect in the workplace. This highlights the potential of efforts that go beyond compliance and strengthen managerial practices to improve jobs in ways that workers value. Third, when presented with realistic variation in wages and earnings, non-wage job attributes elicited stronger preferences than wage increases. This finding both underscores the salience of non-wage job attributes and indicates the need for more attention to how earnings can be improved in GVCs. Fourth, we find surprisingly few differences in worker preferences between men and women. While women place greater value on respectful supervision, safety, and childcare benefits, their overall preferences closely track those of men. Shared preferences across gender groups suggests interventions to improve working conditions need not exacerbate gender inequalities.

2 Good and Bad Jobs in Global Value Chains

GVCs organize a large share of global trade and are linked to millions of jobs (World Bank 2019). Social scientists have long sought to understand how to improve these jobs, which pose challenges to traditional employment relations theories (Lakhani, Kuruvilla, and Avgar 2013). This research is built on assumptions about worker preferences that guide analyses of improvements or deterioration of job quality.

Global labor standards provide the framework for understanding job quality in much of the empirical literature (Oka 2016, Kuruvilla 2021, Short, Toffel, and Hugill 2020, Distelhorst et al. 2015, among others). These standards draw upon international conventions, such as those of the International Labor Organization and reflect the goals of social movements (Bartley 2007). Yet researchers have long questioned whether international standards reflect worker preferences. During formative debates, critics of “social clauses” in trade agreements argued that workers in developing countries do not value the job attributes promoted by activists. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati stated

“diversity in labor practices...reflects, not necessarily venality and wickedness, but rather diversity of cultural values, [and] economic conditions” (1995, p. 754). More recently, industrial relations scholars have suggested that “standards driven by [a] logic of legitimacy concerns” of Northern corporations “may not align with the preferences of factory workers...in developing countries” (Li and Kuruvilla 2023, p. 482). Research has also shown that meeting buyers’ compliance requirements sometimes led to workplace changes misaligned with worker interests (Sinkovics, Hoque, and Sinkovics 2016) and suggested that standards constitute a form of “imperialism”(Khan and Lund-Thomsen 2011).

Using labor standards as a guide for analyzing job quality has limits. Within the confines of compliant employment practices, some jobs remain more desirable to workers than others. Furthermore, worker preferences for job attributes need to be understood in relationship to one another in order to assess trade-offs among them. For example, workers may prefer to accept a higher risk of future unemployment in exchange for higher wages now. Such trade-offs have long been recognized in work on compensating wage differentials, examining non-wage attributes in relation to compensation (Warhurst, Mathieu, and Dwyer 2022). Beyond trade-offs with compensation, the relative strength of worker preferences across non-wage job attributes is important and not yet well understood. Workers may prefer to be treated respectfully by management over having safe workplace. Understanding how workers navigate trade-offs they encounter in the labor market can help design interventions that better address worker priorities and improve job quality in meaningful ways.

Misalignment of worker preferences and labor standards could also frustrate compliance. If workers are indifferent or averse to attributes of jobs emphasized by global standards, then employers have weaker incentive to adopt those practices. Conversely, if firms that comply with standards are also more easily able to attract and retain employees, worker preferences could reinforce global regulatory institutions.

Explicit and implicit claims about what workers want provide our starting point for investigating worker preferences in GVCs. We focus on job attributes that frequently surface in the literature: wages, hours, job stability, safety, work environment, benefits, work intensity, and interpersonal respect. For analytical clarity, we organize them into three categories: earnings, safety and stability, and physical and social stressors in the workplace.

2.1 Earnings

Earnings are a primary interest of workers and, in much of the literature, believed to dominate other job attributes. This view is implicit in arguments that workers want industrial jobs even when they fail to meet international standards. Economist Jeffery Sachs famously stated, “My concern is not that there are too many sweatshops but that there are too few.”¹ Although industrial relations scholars have largely disagreed that more sweatshops are desirable, they have questioned whether workplace standards set in a top-down manner reflect worker priorities, suggesting that workers “prioritize income over other code issues that afford global buyers with legitimacy” (Li and Kuruvilla 2023, p.482). Empirical research from a variety of settings supports this argument. Workers in Cambodia and the Dominican Republic have been found to remove protective equipment, raising injury risk, to boost earnings (Locke, Amengual, and Mangla 2009, Oka 2016). Workers in Ethiopia exhibited a willingness to endure health risks to meet short-term economic needs (Blattman and Dercon 2018). In a global sample of factories producing for a large apparel firm, violations of safety and health standards were not correlated with worker attrition (Li and Kuruvilla 2023). Surveys of factory workers in China indicate that they prefer working hours that exceed legal limits (Chan and Siu 2010), and workers in Bangladesh expressed frustration with overtime limitations that reduced their income (Sinkovics, Hoque, and Sinkovics 2016).

These arguments suggest that GVC workers will show a strong preference for jobs with higher earnings and will be willing to sacrifice non-wage job attributes in exchange for modest gains in earnings. Workers might prefer, for example, that a firm’s limited economic resources be used to increase their wages rather than marginally reduce safety risks. Similarly, when overtime work leads to additional earnings, workers may prefer jobs with long hours over jobs that comply with overtime limits set by private or state regulatory standards. Indeed, empirical research from a range of contexts suggests that low-wage manufacturing workers prefer or at least feel satisfied with longer hours (Nguyen et al. 2025, Zhang, Xu, and Khurshid 2023, Sinkovics, Hoque, and Sinkovics 2016, Kabeer, Haq, and Sulaiman 2019)

However, there have been few direct tests of this predicted preference for earnings over non-wage job characteristics. Workers may value non-wage working conditions more than commonly assumed. In many industrial GVCs, wages are relatively compressed. This can arise from relatively

¹Allen R. Myerson, *New York Times*, ‘In Principle, a Case for More ‘Sweatshops’’, June 22, 1997

uniform productivity within an occupation, from a high minimum wage relative to productivity, or from collusion among employers to keep wages within a certain band. When wages are compressed but non-wage attributes vary widely, workers may prioritize non-wage attributes when choosing jobs. Moreover, earnings typically depend on three components: the hourly or piece rates, the number of hours worked or pieces completed, and benefits that add to overall compensation (bonus payments, transport subsidies, etc.). In labor markets where pay rates are compressed but hours vary widely, higher earnings can principally be achieved by longer hours. Workers may not prefer higher earnings when they come at the cost of long hours, which carry physical and psychological costs, as well as generate conflict with workers' family or personal obligations.

2.2 Safety and Stability

Jobs also vary in worker exposure to risks, potentially creating trade-offs for workers between acceptance of risk and other jobs attributes, notably earnings. Preferences for taking risks vary substantially, with some willing to gain more now even with the possibility of a negative outcome in the longer-term (Falk et al. 2018). We focus on two issues that have been central to the literature on labor in GVCs: workplace safety and job stability.

Workers may prefer lower exposure to risk of workplace injury and demand higher wages to accept riskier jobs (Smith 1979). Safety and accident prevention have long been considered key elements of labor standards (Thomas 1931). In GVCs, safety became more central after internationally salient workplace accidents, including building collapses, factory fires, and mass faintings (McMullen 2013). In contrast with evidence that workers prioritize income over safety, a worker survey in Bangladesh found that safety and job stability were among the most important features of jobs, and higher priorities than wages (Kabeer, Haq, and Sulaiman 2019).

Workers may also value job stability. Researchers have included stability as a key element of job quality, in part because it is necessary for many other positive attributes of jobs (Barrientos, Gereffi, and Rossi 2011). For example, a study of Moroccan apparel workers found that workers who lacked job stability also lacked key benefits, such as the opportunity for skill development (Rossi 2013). While some argue that workers in GVCs seek short-term jobs to tide them over during spells of unemployment (Blattman and Dercon 2018), other evidence suggests that GVC workers value steady employment. Discrete-choice experiments in Bangladesh and Kenya found that workers were willing to give up substantial portions of their salaries for longer-term contracts (Mahmud et al. 2020, Assy et al. 2019).

2.3 Physical and Social Stressors

Given the pervasiveness of low wages and substandard working conditions in GVCs, there has been less attention to attributes that make jobs unpleasant without directly affecting earnings or risk exposure. We focus on three characteristics of a factory’s work environment that can create stress for workers: work intensity, the physical environment, and disrespectful treatment by managers.

Greater work intensity is associated with increased worker stress (Green 2001). In GVCs, Anner (2020) observes that factories that are squeezed by buyers respond, in part, by demanding more production in the same amount of time. Although intensity is not directly addressed in codes of conduct or regulatory standards, research suggests its importance to workers. An ethnography of workers in India found that some workers favored jobs in smaller workshops that offered lower-intensity work, despite unstable earnings and higher safety risks (De Neve 2014).

A second potential stressor relates to discomfort arising from the physical characteristics of the work environment. While some workplaces are clean and well-maintained, others expose workers to dirty, disorganized, and unpleasant conditions. Air quality also varies across workplaces, which is a concern in factories that generate large quantities of dust and are located in the warm tropical and subtropical regions where much of the world’s light manufacturing takes place. Workers may prefer jobs that offer more comfortable physical environments.

Social relationships at work may also be important, particularly respectful treatment by colleagues or superiors (Hoel and Beale 2006). Scholars from a variety of fields start with dignity as a foundational element of job quality (Hodson 2001). This view holds that workers do not want to be treated as mere factors of production but rather as human beings who deserve respect. Despite the long history of this view in studies of work, respect has received sporadic attention in research on labor in GVCs. Focus groups of workers in Lesotho (Pike and Godfrey 2012) and interviews with workers in Bangladesh (Ahmed and Uddin 2022) suggest that worker-supervisor interactions are highly important to workers. Survey data from Bangladesh also shows that respectful treatment by supervisors is correlated with turnover intention (Ahmad, Li, and Ashwin 2026). While being treated disrespectfully is sometimes a violation of laws and private codes of conduct, which have prohibitions against shouting and abuse, it can also manifest in ways that are technically compliant but still transgress social norms of respectful behavior.

2.4 Gender and Preferences

Worker preferences may vary by gender, which is especially salient for light manufacturing firms in GVCs that employ large shares of women workers (Kabeer and Mahmud 2004, Barrientos 2019). We investigate variation in preferences across genders that may arise from two drivers identified in literature: workplace power inequalities and the unequal burden of household responsibilities.

Gendered power inequalities in the workplace may influence worker preferences (Barrientos 2019). A broad literature documents a discourse which construes women workers in GVCs as ‘docile’ (Bair 2010). While this trope is contested, it pervades many factories in GVCs and is associated with a ‘double vulnerability’ for women workers (Tjandraningsih 2000). Research has suggested that women workers are less well positioned than male workers to respond to mistreatment (Kabeer and Mahmud 2004, p. 17). Given gendered power inequalities, women may have stronger preferences for workplaces where supervisors treat workers with respect, thereby reducing the likelihood of mistreatment.

Supervisor gender may also be important to workers. In contexts where men are expected to hold positions of authority, men may be disinclined to work for women supervisors. In addition, in contexts with widespread sexual harassment, women workers may perceive greater risk when working for men supervisors. Surveys of workers in Bangladesh reveal that 40% of production teams had at least one worker who was sexually harassed by a supervisor (Boudreau et al. 2023, p. 4). In apparel factories in Haiti, 39% of workers report that sexual harassment is a problem in their factory (Truskinovsky, Rubin, and Brown 2014, p. 15). Combined, this reasoning suggests diverging preferences for supervisor gender between men and women—with men wanting to work for men, and women wanting to work for women.

Women also generally have greater household responsibilities and engage in substantial unpaid labor in addition to their paid work in factories (Barrientos 2019). As a result, attributes of paid work that increase or decrease conflict with unpaid domestic responsibilities may be more salient for women workers. Workplace benefits that address household responsibilities, such as employer-provided childcare, may be particularly valued by women workers. Long overtime hours may also be less desirable for women workers, especially those who are married, due to needs to balance paid employment with the demands of unpaid domestic work (Kabeer 2004, De Neve 2014).

3 Empirical Approach

We study worker preferences by surveying workers in formal Moroccan apparel firms that participate in GVCs.² The global apparel industry has been a central case in research on working conditions and employment in GVCs and a focus of contention over labor conditions (Bartley 2007).

Morocco exports apparel into the value chains of large retailers serving the European market (Rossi 2013). Compared with countries that dominate apparel value chains, Morocco is in the middle of the distribution of per capita income.³ In 2022, the minimum wage in the Moroccan apparel industry was approximately 57% of the living wage. This is substantially higher than many apparel exporting countries such as Bangladesh (34%), Tunisia (41%), and Cambodia (47%), but lower than others such as Pakistan (58%), Turkey (65%), and South Africa (66%).⁴ Morocco has struggled to generate sufficient jobs for its growing population, resulting in unemployment rates around 10% and low labor market participation (Lopez-Acevedo et al. 2021). The apparel industry in Morocco has a majority women workforce and a sizable share of in-country migrants, both typical features of apparel export industries. Workers have limited representation by independent trade unions—only 3% were covered by collective bargaining agreements in 2020⁵—and must navigate a labor market with substantial variation in employment practices. Employers range from formal firms operating within regulatory frameworks to informal enterprises that routinely violate labor standards, as illustrated by the tragic flooding of a Tangier factory that killed 28 workers in 2021. Research has shown that some workers have stable jobs and are paid minimum wage, while others are more precarious and are consistently paid below the minimum (Rossi 2013). These characteristics make the Moroccan apparel industry an appropriate context to explore worker preferences, as workers neither face the limited options of the most precarious rungs of the global industry, nor is Morocco an example of a highly regulated sector dominated by firms offering only the highest quality jobs.

We accessed factories to sample workers through the Spanish apparel firm Inditex, under a

²Research was approved by the authors' institutional review boards and pre-registered (see Section A6.3).

³Per capita income (USD 2023) in Morocco was \$3,771. For comparison: Pakistan \$1,365, Cambodia \$2,429, India \$2,480, Bangladesh \$2,551, Vietnam \$4,282, Indonesia \$4,876, China \$12,614, and Turkey \$13,105. Source: World Bank

⁴Source: Estimates from the Industry We Want (<https://www.theindustrywewant.com/wages>).

⁵Source: International Labor Organization. Industrial Relations Data. <https://ilostat.ilo.org/methods/concepts-and-definitions/description-industrial-relations-data/>

research agreement between the firm and the researchers’ universities.⁶ The sampling frame was all Moroccan factories that had an active commercial relationship with Inditex in 2022. While this approach limits our sample, the large size of the buyer meant that our sampling frame included approximately one-third of Moroccan workers in the industry. We sampled factories from Morocco’s two main apparel producing regions, Tangier and Casablanca. We focused on two regions because doing so allowed us to conduct resource-intensive face-to-face surveys that provide high quality evidence while ensuring the broadest possible coverage of workers. This sampling approach informs the scope conditions for our study: we are able to draw inferences about the preferences of people who are currently working in formal manufacturing firms tied to GVCs. Our analyses are limited in their ability to provide insight into the preferences of the unemployed, workers in the informal sector, or workers in countries with starkly different economic, political, or social characteristics.

3.1 Survey Design

Survey design was informed by on-site observation and semi-structured interviews with 36 respondents in factories in Tangier, detailed in Appendix Section A1. The interviews probed worker views of job attributes that are salient in the literature and included open-ended questions that sought worker preferences in an unstructured manner. The interviews and site observations informed how we translated attributes of jobs into the local context. They also helped to design questions workers could understand and answer comfortably. The field research indicated that presenting questions in written text would create difficulty for workers with limited literacy. Therefore, we used a face-to-face, verbal interview method, with enumerators reading the questions to each respondent. The fieldwork also led us to exclude some job attributes that would have been difficult for workers to evaluate—notably worker voice, union representation, and collective bargaining. Workers we interviewed had limited familiarity with voice mechanisms, so their responses would have been speculative. Analysis of these job attributes awaits future research.

We assess multi-dimensional worker preferences using a conjoint experiment (Bansak et al. 2021b) that asked respondents to indicate their preferred job between two options, each of which had a randomly selected set of job attributes. By aggregating thousands of these decisions, we infer the relative strength of worker preferences for each attributes. The vignette presentation approximated a conversation among workers about two job opportunities that one worker was considering.

⁶Funding for this research was provided entirely by the researchers’ universities. Inditex managers were present during preliminary fieldwork, but none were present during the survey.

This design mirrored how workers talked about jobs and job searches during the semi-structured interviews. Table 1 provides an example pair of jobs as they were read to the respondents.⁷ Each job contained eleven attributes, which is well below the maximum methodologists recommend for conjoint experiments (Bansak et al. 2021a). All job attributes are listed in Table 2.⁸

Placeholder for Table 1

Placeholder for Table 2

3.2 Job Attributes

Presenting descriptions of wages and hours involved a set of trade-offs. The survey required simplicity so that respondents could clearly understand all attributes of the job. Yet pay in apparel factories in Morocco involves the combination of hourly wages and weekly bonuses. Work hours, which vary widely by season, also strongly influence total earnings. During the low season (November to January) demand declines and factories reduce hours or even temporarily close, while during the high season there is often overtime work and bonuses on top of the hourly wage. We chose to vary jobs in terms of wages, high season hours, and low-season hours, and to provide workers with information how these attributes combine to determine their annual earnings.

To set wages, we investigated typical hourly wages in Moroccan factories at the time of the survey (for more detail, see Appendix Section A3 and Figure A1). In typical factories, most workers make the minimum wage of 14.81 Moroccan Dirhams (MAD) per hour.⁹ The remainder of the workers generally make 15 to 17 MAD per hour. To create realistic jobs while including variation in wages, we presented wages ranging from 15 MAD to 18 MAD per hour, with a peak

⁷Attribute order was partially randomized, with wage and hours always at the start and all other attributes presented in random order. The order remained the same within each respondent to reduce confusion.

⁸A full copy of the survey is posted on OSF. See Appendix, Section A4.

⁹At the time of the survey, 1 MAD = US 0.10 = Euro 0.09

wage slightly higher than what was normal in factories at the time. This approach preserved realism but also meant that our study could not evaluate worker responses to higher wage ranges.

The job description also specified weekly working hours in the high and low seasons. We selected hour ranges informed by scholarly debates, which includes arguments that workers prefer longer hours than permitted, and interviews, during which some workers expressed concern with excessively long hours and preferences for consistent hours during the low season. We chose to build job scenarios with high-season hours of 50, 60, or 75 hours per week, and low-season hours of 44, 20, or 10 hours per week.

Calculating annual earnings from wages and hours requires knowing how many weeks per year involve overtime and when bonuses are added for meeting production targets, as well as the length of the low season with reduced work hours. We calculated annual earnings assuming four regular work weeks a year, 12 weeks in the low season, 36 weeks in the high season, and 200 MAD bonuses per week in the high season. Presenting all of this information to respondents would have made the survey exceedingly complicated. Therefore, the enumerators simply informed workers of three job attributes: the hourly wage, the hours in high and low seasons, and the resulting annual earnings. Due to the wide range in working hours, annual earnings had a wider distribution than hourly wages, ranging from 38,600 to 68,400 MAD per year (see Section A3). This distribution includes earnings both above and below estimates of the living wage for apparel workers in Morocco, which was between 52,896 and 66,960 MAD per year in 2022. Comparing to the lower bound of this range, 39% of job profiles offered earnings at or above the living wage threshold.¹⁰

The jobs also offered randomized benefits that fieldwork indicated were present in the local labor market: (1) transportation subsidies, (2) a program for personal health, (3) literacy education, and (4) employer-provided childcare. Each job profile offered at most one of these benefits.

Turning to safety, semi-structured interviews uncovered challenges in concisely communicating objective safety metrics, such as the probability of an accident of a certain severity. When workers talked about safety in the interviews, they recalled subjective judgments they made about risks in factories where they previously worked. We followed this approach and described safety through the subjective views of workers in the hypothetical factory. The job choices included one of three descriptions: (1) workers always consider the factory very safe; (2) workers consider the

¹⁰Living wage estimates come from The Industry We Want, which combines data from a variety of sources to estimate the gap between statutory minimum wages and living wages.

factory relatively safe, but sometimes have concerns about safety; and (3) workers are always very concerned about factory safety.

To capture variation in job stability, we focused on the intended outcomes of regulations that limit precarious work. We chose this approach because during semi-structured interviews we learned that employment contracts did not always guarantee job stability. Consequently, we could not simply describe a job as providing a formal contract or not. The job stability attribute included three alternative practices typical of the local labor market: (1) workers tend to keep their jobs as long as they want to stay at the factory; (2) workers are often asked to leave the factory every 6 months and are re-hired; (3) workers might lose their jobs at any time. The first description indicates the greatest stability. The second reflects instability due to employers circumventing contracting standards. The third suggests that workers in the factory have effectively no stability.

For physical stressors, we included two attributes: work intensity and workplace cleanliness. During fieldwork, it became clear that factories exhibited substantial differences in the pace of work. Translating this into the ways in which workers talked about jobs, we described the hypothetical jobs as either: (1) work pace is comfortable; or (2) work pace is uncomfortably fast. To capture cleanliness, each job used one of the following three statements: (1) building is always very clean and well ventilated; (2) building is often clean and well ventilated, but sometimes not; (3) building is always unclean and poorly ventilated. These descriptions also came from our interviews with workers and observations of the range of factory environments in our sample.

For social stressors, we manipulated accounts of how supervisors treated workers. In interviews, workers often discussed the management’s respectfulness as a reason that they chose to work in their current factory or that they left a previous job. The job descriptions stated that the supervisor is either someone: (1) who always treats workers with respect; (2) who is usually respectful to workers, but sometimes not; or (3) who is often disrespectful to workers. When we described the potential supervisor, we included his or her gender. While we used uniform distributions for other non-wage features of jobs, we knew that women do not make up half of all supervisors. The job profiles therefore indicated a woman supervisor in 30% of cases and man supervisor in 70% of cases, which approximated their proportions in Moroccan factories.

3.3 Sample and Survey Implementation

The survey was completed in May and June 2022. We used a two-stage sampling technique—first sampling factories, then workers. We took a random sample of factories that met our inclusion

criteria, stratified by city and size, with the probability of a factory being sampled proportional to the number of workers in the factory. Within each factory, the survey teams drew a random sample of fifty workers. The sampling frame included all production workers, excluding supervisors. To ensure that the sample included all present workers, even those that may not be formally registered as employees of the factory, workers were selected from the production floor instead of from the payroll. Appendix Section A2 details the sampling process.

Using a recruitment script, the survey team approached sampled workers and asked them to participate. Workers were informed that the survey team had the permission of management, but workers did not have to participate if they did not want to and their participation would have no impact on them or any workers in the factory. Of all workers approached, 0.7% refused and were replaced with another worker. This low reject rate appeared to be due to the factory management agreeing to release workers for a production break during the survey. The workers who agreed were then asked to meet with locally-based enumerators in a private location within the factory, where the enumerator sought informed consent and then conducted the survey. The enumerators asked all questions verbally in Moroccan Arabic, repeating questions when the worker expressed confusion. In total, workers evaluated 7,223 pairs of jobs, resulting in 14,446 observations for the job choice analyses.


One challenge of worker surveys is eliciting unbiased responses, especially when surveys are conducted in factories. We took several measures to ensure that responses would be confidential. The surveys were conducted in a private location, such as an office or an isolated area of a canteen, physically separated from management. The survey team did not collect names or other directly identifying information. Although we made these steps clear to respondents and assured them of confidentiality, we were aware that workers might doubt our assurances. Therefore, we took additional measures to gain reliable responses. First, we asked about hypothetical jobs, rather than workers' own jobs, which allowed workers to express preferences without feeling as if they were complaining about conditions in their current jobs. Second, we created additional distance by asking workers to advise 'a friend' like themselves, rather than to directly state their preferences. Third, our use of a conjoint experiment that mixes potentially sensitive issues with non-sensitive issues further mitigated social desirability bias (Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto 2022). For example, a worker may be concerned about directly stating a preference against a job with a woman supervisor. The hypothetical job descriptions place any attribute perceived as sensitive,

in this case supervisor gender, among ten other job attributes, including benefits and wages. If the worker expresses a preference against a job with a woman supervisor, the worker will also be expressing a preference for a job with a certain type of benefit, wage, etc. The enumerator cannot determine (and did not ask) why a respondent expressed a preference for any particular job.

Appendix Table A3 provides descriptive statistics. Overall, 69% of surveyed workers were women. In terms of education, 16% had no formal education and 31% had completed primary school. Workers averaged 11 years of experience in the apparel industry (median 8 years). The workers varied substantially in age, with the largest group being between 21 and 30 years old. Less than half of the workers were married and 56% reported having children under 18 in the household. We define a dependent as anyone other than the worker who depends on the worker’s income. Overall, 89% of workers reported having dependents, with an average of 2.6 per worker. We define migrants as those who did not grow up in the city where the factory is located. By this definition, migrants accounted for 45% of the sample.

4 Estimation and Results

Our main analysis estimates marginal means that “describe the level of favorability towards profiles that have a particular feature level, ignoring all other features” (Leeper, Hobolt, and Tilley 2020, p. 2010). Marginal means can be interpreted as the probability that a job with a certain characteristic is preferred by respondents making a choice between two job profiles. Because marginal mean estimation requires categorical variables, these analyses discretize the continuous wage attribute at 1 MAD intervals. Figure 1 presents the marginal means and their confidence intervals. The Appendix reports model estimates in Table A4, pairwise comparisons of marginal means in Table A7, and tests of differences across job attributes in Table A8. Appendix Section A4 also discusses deviations from our pre-analysis plan.



4.1 Earnings

Workers prefer jobs at the higher end of the wage scale, selecting them with a 51.5% probability. However, this preference is not very strong, with workers only 1.9 percentage points more likely

to choose a job at the highest wage range compared with the lowest ($p=0.067$). Workers were indifferent between jobs in the 15-16 and 16-17 MAD per hour ranges ($p=0.97$). This surprising result suggests that worker preferences for greater hourly earnings are not strong when the range of possible wages reflect those available in the local labor market. Turning to hours, we find a small worker preference for jobs that offer more hours in the low season; workers select a job with a low season of 10 hours per week with a probability of 48.7%, 20 hours per week at 50.2%, and 44 hours per week at 51.1%. Only the difference between the lowest and highest is statistically significant ($p=0.01$) and the magnitude is not large (2.5 percentage points). For high-season hours, we identify no clear pattern. Respondents select a job with 50 hours with a probability of 50.2%, 60 hours with 48.5%, and 75 hours with 51.3%. Only the difference between 60 and 75 hours was statistically distinguishable ($p=0.02$).

In addition to wages, benefits influence worker economic gains. Workers do prefer jobs that offer more benefits, but these preferences are also relatively weak compared with other job attributes. As shown in Figure 1, workers selected a job with a health program with a probability of 52.8%, childcare 51.7%, transport subsidies 50.3%, and literacy education 49.0%. We do not observe any differences in preferences for benefits across workers with more and fewer dependents.

4.1.1 Probing wages and hours

The modest effect of wages and hours is surprising. We take a series of steps to probe this finding further. First, we reanalyze our data excluding the possibility of interaction effects between hourly wage and total hours, which was made salient by the inclusion of annual earnings in the job descriptions. As described above, the broader range in hours than in wages made hours the primary determinant of annual earnings, potentially attenuating the effect of hourly wages. To investigate this possibility, we take a subsample of observations in which the hours worked were the same for both jobs (Appendix Table A5 and Figure A2).¹¹ This subsample excludes the possibility of interactions between wages and hours, at the cost of reduced statistical precision in a smaller sample ($N=1,498$). In this subsample, we find that workers prefer a job with a wage of 15-16 MAD 48.5% of the time, 16-17 MAD 48.7% of the time, and 17-18 MAD 54.8% of the time. The difference between the highest wage and the lowest wage reaches 6.3 percentage points, a three-fold increase

¹¹To illustrate, when workers were presented with a job in which there are 50 hours per week in the high season for both jobs, and 44 hours per week in the low season for both jobs, the difference in the annual wage is only a function of the difference in the hourly wage. Therefore, any bias in our estimates should be eliminated.


from the estimate using all job pairs. This result indicates that the interaction between wages and hours did contribute to the unexpected results, but the preference for increased hourly wages still is relatively modest, especially compared to non-wage attributes discussed below.

Second, the small effect size may be driven, in part, by the narrow range of hourly wages, with a 20% gap between the top and bottom wage and an average difference between paired jobs of 6.3%. We choose this distribution of wages based on the information gathered during fieldwork to reflect the range of jobs available to workers. Yet, in the context of many other attributes of jobs, the small differences in wages might have been insufficient to strongly factor into workers' choices. We probe this issue in two ways. One approach we take is to estimate the strength of preference for annual earnings, ignoring the variation in hours and hourly wages. This approach provides much greater variation—the highest annual earnings (68,400 MAD) is 77% greater than the lowest (38,600 MAD). The annual earnings variable includes both the cost of longer hours and the benefit of higher income, allowing for a direct examination of the intuition that workers in GVCs primarily want to maximize income even at the expense of leisure time. The results, reported in Appendix Figure A3, shows that at the lowest range of earnings (38,600 - 46,050) workers had a 48.2% probability of choosing a job, whereas at the highest range (60,950 - 68,400) the probability was 50.9%. Thus, the differences between the highest and lowest values remain substantively small even when examining annual earnings.

Another way to assess the role of wage compression is to examine whether workers respond more strongly to higher earnings when the difference in hourly wages between the paired profiles is larger. We examine this by estimating a series of marginal means models, progressively restricting the sample to pairs of jobs where the hourly wage gap exceeds an increasing threshold ranging from 1% to 18%, in 1 percentage point increments (Figure 2). We focus on the probability of workers selecting jobs with the highest wage level (17-18 MAD) and the lowest wage level (15-16 MAD). The model included the middle range, but we omit it from the graph for clarity. We find that the strength of preferences for high hourly wages remains relatively small and stable for pairs with up to a 13% wage gap—the probability of workers selecting a job 17-18 MAD is 52.9%, and selecting a job at the lowest wages is 47.1%. Beyond that point, however, the point estimates for the probability of workers selecting a higher wage job rises steadily, reaching 57.0% among pairs where the wage gap exceeds 18%, and the probability of workers selecting lower wage jobs also decreases, reaching 43%—a 14 point difference. While estimates with progressively smaller sample sizes are

imprecise and appropriate caution is needed in interpreting the point estimates, the pattern in the data suggests that wage compression is attenuating the strength of workers' preference for higher hourly wages—workers are relatively indifferent to wages when the differences in hourly wages in the jobs available to them are small, but when the gap is larger, wages play a more prominent role in their choices.¹²

Overall, these analyses suggest that in a context in which income increases with effort (in terms of hours worked) and wages are compressed, each incremental increase in wages only has a small impact on workers' probability of preferring a job.



4.2 Safety and Stability

Figure 1 shows that workers have a strong preference for workplace safety. For safety, there is a 10 percentage point difference in the probability that workers will select a job in a factory that is always considered safe (55%) compared with a factory that is always considered unsafe (45%). Worker preferences for job stability are even stronger than those for safety. Respondents selected a job that workers 'tend to keep' 60.9% of the time. This was one of the two most desirable attributes of jobs (along with supervisor respect, discussed below). By contrast, they selected a job that they could 'lose any time' (41.2%) and in a factory that asks workers to leave and be rehired (47.6%) substantially less often. The difference between the best and worst jobs by stability was 19.7 percentage points, indicating a very strong preference for a stable job.

4.3 Physical and Social Stressors

Turning to physical and social stressors at work, workers have an aversion to unclean and poorly ventilated factories and have a 43.3% probability of selecting jobs with this attribute. They prefer jobs in factories that are somewhat unclean/ventilated, with a probability of 51.7%, and clean/well

¹²In the Appendix, we replicate this exercise using the AMCE estimator (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; see Section 5.1). This approach estimates the causal effect of a one MAD increase on the probability of selecting a profile, rather than comparing selection probabilities across discrete wage levels, allowing a direct evaluation of how marginal utility changes at different wage gaps. Results (Figure A4) confirm that the marginal utility of an additional MAD increases with the size of the wage gap, more than doubling between the 13% and 18% thresholds. This suggests that when wage differences are small, worker preferences for higher wages are weak.

ventilated at 55.1%. The magnitude of these differences, 11.8 percentage points, is similar to that of factory safety, indicating a strong preference for a comfortable and orderly work environment. Respondents also preferred factories with a comfortable working pace (54.1%), compared to 45.8% probability of selecting jobs with an uncomfortably fast pace.

Supervisor respect had the largest effect on the probability of workers selecting a job, similar in magnitude to job stability. Workers had a 61.8% probability of selecting a job in which the supervisor always treated workers with respect. By contrast, workers had a 47.1% probability of selecting a job in which supervisors were ‘usually’ respectful, and a 40.7% probability of selecting a job in which the supervisors were often disrespectful. The range of these probabilities is extremely large—21.4 percent points—showing that workers strongly prefer jobs that minimize social stressors.

5 Preferences by Gender

How different are worker preferences across women and men? Figure 3 reports the marginal means by gender. The left panel reports the marginal means for each group separately and the right panel shows the difference (women minus men; positive values mean women prefer an attribute more than men).¹³ Overall, the test of group differences between men and women rejects the null of no differences ($F(21,14406)=1.58$, $p=0.04$).

When examining specific attributes, we find mixed support for the expectations derived from theory. In terms of satisfying demands outside of the workplace, we find a difference in preferences for childcare, with women 3.9 percentage points more likely to choose a job that offers childcare compared to men ($p=0.031$). However, we do not find that women have different preferences from men regarding hours. We continue to observe a small preferences for steady work during the low season and no clear pattern regarding overtime work in the high season.


We find that women had stronger preferences than men for jobs in which supervisors treated workers with respect, suggesting the importance of gendered power inequalities in shaping preferences. While men had a 42.4% probability of selecting a job with a supervisor who was ‘often disrespectful’, for women the probability was 39.8% ($p=0.055$). Conversely, men had a 59.1% probability of selecting a job for which the supervisor is always respectful, compared to a 63.1% probability among women ($p=0.002$). This finding is congruent with research on gender in manufacturing GVCs, which has found that gendered power inequality renders women more

¹³See also Appendix Tables A9, A10 and A11

exposed to disrespectful treatment and less able to defend themselves when it occurs (Kabeer 2004).

We did not, however, find that women workers wanted to work for women supervisors or that men workers wanted to work for men. Instead, we find indifference across the two groups for supervisor gender. This result may be because what is important to women workers is how they are treated, not the gender of the supervisor. We explore this possibility further in Figure A8 in the Appendix. We find women workers do not want to work for men *or women* who show them disrespect. Furthermore, women workers have even more negative responses to working for women supervisors who are disrespectful than men workers. This finding suggests that men are not, on average, averse to being under the authority of women supervisors and may be better positioned to resist in an environment where mistreatment is pervasive. It also suggests that women workers may be more vulnerable to disrespectful treatment by women supervisors. While these findings will require further investigation to uncover the specific mechanisms, they are broadly congruent with theories of gendered power inequalities in GVC factories (Kabeer 2004).

Unexpectedly, we uncover differences in worker preferences by gender for safety. Women are more averse to unsafe factories than men—the probability of a woman selecting a job in an unsafe factory was 44.1% compared to 47.0% for men ($p = 0.024$). This result is also consistent with theories of gendered power relationships in the workplace; women workers may be more likely to believe that working in an unsafe factory would expose them to injury, as they have less power to resist exposure to risks.



5.1 Further Analysis and Robustness

To further probe these results, we undertake a series of analyses that focus on the persistence of strong preferences for non-earnings attributes of work. First, we explore whether worker preferences for non-wage job attributes continue to be strong when there is a larger wage gap between the pairs of job profiles presented to workers. Above, we reported analyses showing that preferences regarding hourly wages increase at the largest wage gaps. Does this imply that workers are more indifferent

to other job attributes when evaluating jobs with a large wage gap? Appendix Figure A5 shows that worker preferences regarding safety, stability, physical and social stressors remain strong even when workers evaluate job pairs with larger differences in wages.

Second, we examine subgroups of respondents in Appendix Section A5. We begin with workers who have children at home and workers with many dependents, hypothesis tests included in our pre-analysis plan. Workers with and without children at home exhibit the same pattern of results (Figure A9). An omnibus test reveals no overall difference: ($F(21,14404)=0.80, p=0.73$). We also compare workers who have greater income needs due to larger numbers of dependents. When we split the sample at the median (2 dependents), the results, shown in Figure A6 and Table A13, reveal no substantial differences between those with more and fewer dependents ($F(21,14404)=0.78, p=0.75$). We extend this analysis further to a subgroup facing even greater economic pressure: workers with dependents whose spouse does not work (Figure A7). The results again closely mirror the baseline estimates ($F(21,14404)=1.20, p=0.24$). These results are congruent with the argument that even workers who have pressing economic needs have strong preferences non-wage attributes of work. We also probe the possibility that migrant workers have distinct preferences, as research in other contexts has suggested that migrant workers prefer long overtime hours because they are far from their families and prioritize maximizing earnings (Zhang, Xu, and Khurshid 2023). Results of analyses comparing migrants and non-migrants do not, however, find that migrants have different preferences (Figure A11, $F(21,14404)=0.91, p=0.58$), nor that migrants are more likely to select jobs with longer hours.

Appendix Section A6 probes the robustness of our findings to alternative estimation approaches and modeling decisions. Examining our choice to discretize wages, we report consistent results with varying wage bin widths in Appendix Table A12. Going further, we report three alternative estimation approaches, all of which produce results broadly consistent with the marginal means analysis. First, the average marginal component effect (AMCE) (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014) estimates the causal effect of changing an attribute level relative to a baseline, allowing us to analyze wages as a continuous variable. Results confirm that non-wage attributes such as safety, job stability and supervisor respect have large and significant effects, while the linear effect of wages is small (Appendix Tables A14 and A15). Second, the average component preference (ACP) (Ganter 2021) measures the probability that a profile with a given attribute level is selected over one without it, centering estimates around zero. Unlike the AMCE, the ACP

does not depend on the choice of baseline category and is designed to identify preferences rather than causal effects. The results of ACP closely mirror the marginal mean estimates in our main analyses (Appendix Table A16). Third, we conducted a willingness-to-pay (WTP) analysis that converts workers preferences into monetary units (Appendix Tables A17 and A18). In our pre-analysis plan, we intended for the WTP to be our main approach. By scaling each attribute’s effect by the wage coefficient, WTP expresses how much additional pay a worker would need to accept a worse level of that attribute. However, for the reasons discussed above, we believe that our wage estimates are influenced by the interaction of hours and wages as well as wage compression, which implies that the WTP values are likely inflated. While the WTP results do not change our overall interpretation—safety, stability, and respectful treatment remain the most highly valued job attributes—we interpret them with caution.

6 Conclusion

Much of the research on working conditions in GVCs examines compliance with labor standards set by international organizations or corporations. The use of standards to define good jobs has meant that relatively little attention has been paid to workers’ preferences, leaving open questions regarding what workers in GVCs actually value in their jobs. This lack of attention to worker preferences has allowed for unresolved competing arguments regarding workers willingness to accept poor working conditions in order to earn a marginally higher wage.

Building on a tradition in industrial relations (Freeman and Rogers 2006, Hertel-Fernandez, Kimball, and Kochan 2022), this study asked workers what they want. The findings from Moroccan apparel workers in GVCs reveal preferences inconsistent with the view that workers willingly tolerate ‘sweatshop’ conditions. Instead, workers’ preferences suggest that they when they are confronted with choices among jobs with wages that are realistically available in their local labor market, they have strong preferences for non-wage attributes of jobs.

Workers in this study valued many of the goals embedded in the labor standards that are meant to regulate GVCs. Health and safety standards are closely aligned with worker preferences: workers preferred safe workplaces even at the expense of lower earnings. Similarly, job stability provisions, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative’s prohibition on the “excessive use of fixed-term contracts of employment”,¹⁴ align with the strong preference for job stability revealed in our survey.

¹⁴<https://www.ethicaltrade.org/eti-base-code>

For overtime hours, our findings are more mixed. We do not find strong preferences for or against working hours that exceed standard regulatory limits, possibly because longer hours, while more demanding, also lead to greater earnings. Overall, these findings assuage concerns that the top-down processes that have shaped international labor standards are disconnected from worker preferences. They suggest that improving enforcement of codes of conduct through interventions to increase worker voice or penalizing factories that fail to comply (Boudreau 2024, Amengual and Distelhorst 2025) may better align jobs with worker preferences.

Our evidence also shows that workers want more than compliance with minimum standards. Most notably, workers showed strong preferences for jobs in factories where supervisors treat workers with respect. The way managers treat workers is an important part of workers' daily experiences on the factory floor. Returning to our interview data, one of the most common reasons people gave for joining a factory was that they had heard from friends or family that the managers treated workers well. Others talked about the importance of dialogue with supervisors, who are often their primary contact for any issues that they have at work, especially when formal grievance mechanisms are weak.

Supervisor respectfulness may be improved through both direct and indirect interventions. First, training may help supervisors to improve how they manage and communicate with workers. The ILO provides supervisor training programs through Better Work and the ILO-Garment Industry Project, with some evidence of its benefits (Babbitt, Voegeli, and Brown 2016). Yet, other research finds that factory management does not value supervisor training (Macchiavello, Rabbani, and Woodruff 2015), indicating significant implementation challenges. Second, research suggests that buyer purchasing practices create pressures that contribute to disrespectful treatment (Kuruville and Li 2025). A second pathway to improving supervisor respectfulness therefore involves structural changes in GVC purchasing that reduce pressure on supervisors. Third, improving worker voice, grievance mechanisms, and collective representation provides countervailing power on the factory floor that reduces abusive treatment. Researchers have explored a range of institutional means to improve worker voice, even in contexts with limited freedom of association (Anner and Fischer-Daly 2023).

Our analysis of gender found more similarities than differences between women and men. Although this finding is congruent with research suggesting that women and men workers share many of the same concerns (Kabeer 2004), the lack of preferences for gender-aligned supervisors was

surprising. While research in other contexts has found difficulty promoting women to supervisory roles (Macchiavello et al. 2020), our results indicate that men may not avoid jobs with women supervisors when they have information about supervisor respectfulness. Similar preferences across genders for job stability, work intensity, work hours, workplace environment, and wages suggest that interventions to improve these dimensions of job quality will benefit both genders roughly equally. By contrast, women’s strong preference for respectful supervisors suggests an opportunity to improve jobs in a particularly meaningful way for women workers.

Our findings on earnings were unexpected. When presented with choices reflecting the range of jobs available in their local labor market, worker preferences for higher wages did not dominate other job attributes. This finding challenges assumptions that workers are willing to sacrifice non-monetary job attributes, such as safety, for small increases in wages. At the same time, this finding raises questions regarding the structure of earnings in many industrial jobs in GVCs. In contexts where wages are compressed, variation in income comes mainly from variation in work hours, and working conditions vary substantially across jobs, workers prioritize non-wage attributes that reduce risk and daily hardships. At the same time, we cannot conclude that workers are uninterested in higher earnings, only that preferences for wages need to be considered alongside the way earnings are determined by combinations of effort and wages, and by the maximum gains possible at equal levels of effort. If anything, our findings suggest that wage increases would need to be substantially larger than those currently available in the Moroccan labor market to meaningfully shape workers’ choices. Pathways to increase wages without substantially longer hours include certain manufacturing management interventions (Lollo and O’Rourke 2020, Distelhorst and Shin 2023) as well as broader political and bargaining processes (Caraway, Ford, and Nguyen 2019).

Our study has important limitations. The range of job attributes we could investigate was limited by our study method and context. A key concern in stated preference experiments is that what workers say may not reflect what they would actually do if faced with the choice in real life. This concern is particularly important when respondents face unfamiliar or implausible scenarios, as they may lack well-formed preferences (Diamond and Hausman 1994). To mitigate this concern, we designed our survey to ask workers about job features that they were familiar with and that were relevant in the local context. Prioritizing realism, however, constrained the type and scope of job characteristics we could examine. We excluded attributes of job quality, such flexible hours and autonomy, that may be valued by workers but are not offered in contemporary light

manufacturing. Relatedly, we did not include attributes of worker voice or collective representation. In interviews, we found that many workers were not familiar with many basic forms of worker voice, such as mixed worker-management committees. Collective bargaining is not well developed in the Moroccan apparel sector. Given low worker familiarity with these important attributes of industrial relations systems, related questions risked drawing incorrect inferences about their preferences. Complementary research can utilize other methods, such as focus groups, that allow workers to consider a broader range of labor relations possibilities.

On wages, the profiles presented a range realistic within the local formal labor market. This excluded wages below the legal minimum, which meant workers rarely evaluated wage offers that represented losses relative to their current wage. By contrast, some profiles likely represented a worsening of conditions they already enjoyed at work (e.g. if they currently have a respectful supervisor and evaluate a profile with a disrespectful one). They also never evaluated positions with hourly wages more than 22% above the minimum wage. Future research may examine a broader wage range, including sub-minimum wages, as well as higher earnings at equal levels of effort, to develop a fuller understanding of how workers evaluate pay.

There are limits in the degree to which we can generalize from workers in one sector, one country, and one supply chain to the diverse populations of workers in GVCs. The scope conditions of our study are limited to workers with similar attributes to those in our sample—those with jobs in formal firms integrated into GVCs in places with similar economic, political and social characteristics. An oral survey conducted through face-to-face interviews ensured that workers with limited literacy could participate, but its inefficiency prevented study of a larger cross-national sample. Features of the local labor markets in Tangier and Casablanca, the past experiences of the workers in this industry, local minimum wage policy, and culture more broadly may all play a role in shaping worker preferences.

One notable attribute of our local context is wage compression combined with strong contrasts in other attributes of work. This may have played an important role in worker preferences for job attributes. Research in other industrial clusters reveals similar wage compression at and above the minimum wage. One study of export firms in Tirupur, India found 30% of garment workers earned exactly minimum wage and that the association of exporting firms colluded to keep wages compressed (Sharma 2024). Another study of garment factories in Bangladesh found that average wages were extremely close to the minimum wage; in one category of workers, 80% were

paid within 5% of minimum wage (Menzel and Woodruff 2017). This wage compression in other manufacturing clusters suggests that the heavily weighted non-wage preferences observed in our study may extend to other locales.

The selection process that generated our worker sample may also shape the results. We study workers who had secured employment in factories supplying European buyers that privately regulate their suppliers. If these workers' preferences deviate greatly from other industrial workers, the estimates here may not apply elsewhere. If workers perceived, for example, that these factories offered greater safety and stability but less opportunity to earn high wages, the small wage effects we estimate might be larger in other samples. Yet, these workers may perceive themselves as relatively well paid and have less experience of severe workplace violations than workers in non-exporting firms and, therefore, may attach greater importance to wages while undervaluing workplace safety. This makes the direction of any selection effect theoretically ambiguous.

More broadly, it may be productive to examine worker preferences jointly with worker mobility—workers do select into their jobs, but that sorting is likely imperfect and labor markets are segmented. Preferences may be better understood in a contextualized fashion that takes selection and worker exposure to different job attributes into account. A broad research agenda to identify not only what workers want, but developing fuller set of theories of the factors that influence worker preferences, can substantially contribute to the literature on labor in GVCs.

Beyond considering a greater range of job attributes and a wider sample, complementing survey research with studies of behavior will be important for furthering empirical work on preferences. Researchers have helpfully examined employee attrition as an indicator of how workers perceive their jobs (Li and Kuruvilla 2023). Micro-level studies that investigate how interventions to improve jobs influence attrition and job applications seem promising.

Although GVC researchers have naturally focused on studying compliance with labor standards, they have also sought to make jobs better for workers more broadly. Improving industrial democracy within firms participating in GVCs is clearly crucial to this goal. In the meantime, institutions of transnational labor governance continue to evolve, but the processes of change are often far removed from the workers who are the intended beneficiaries. Studying worker preferences offers one pathway to better aligning transnational labor governance with the interests of the diverse workers participating in global value chains.

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Online Appendix

What Jobs Do Workers Want? Workers Preferences in Global Values Chains

A1 Qualitative Interview Methods

We sampled respondents for the qualitative interviews in two steps. First, we sampled factories in Tangier that were active in the supply chain of the buyer. We excluded the smallest and the largest factories (in terms of numbers of employees) to ensure that the factories we sampled were typical. We then created groups of factories by size, portion of output produced for the buyer, and compliance rating in their latest audit. We sampled within these groups, creating a list of factories based in a particular order so that trying to select the first, then second, third, etc. would generate an appropriate, and varied, random sample. We ultimately approached 21 factories to gain access to 8. The main constraint was timing of the visit—many factories could not accommodate interviews in the window of time during the fieldwork.

Within each factory, we began with interviews with management. These interviews took place in English, Spanish or Arabic with translation. We then sampled workers. In six factories, workers were randomly sampled from the production floor. We purposefully varied gender, age, and role in the production process. In two factories, management was concerned about production disruptions and influenced the selection of workers. The interviews took place in a private room within the factory (often the infirmary). They were translated from Arabic to English or Spanish. Overall, we interviewed 36 respondents. The mean interview time was 25 minutes, median 20. The interviews were not recorded to encourage respondents to speak openly.

The worker interviews followed a semi-structured protocol, but also included a series of close ended questions that we used to test how complex survey questions would be understood by workers. This list of questions evolved as the fieldwork progressed and we adjusted to the data that we gathered.

A2 Survey Implementation

We piloted the survey in three factories in Casablanca with 68 respondents. During and after the pilot, we debriefed the enumerators on the structure of specific questions and adjusted any elements that created confusion.

Table A1: Semi-Structured Interviews

Code	Gender	Position (if Available)	Time	Worker or Manager
F1M1	M	Manager	90	M
F1M2	W	HR Manager	90	M
F1W1	W	Transporter	60	W
F1W2	W	Packing	30	W
F1W3	W	Packing	30	W
F1W3	W	Supervisor	30	W
F2M1	M	Manager	30	M
F2W1	W	Machinist	30	W
F2W2	W	Transporter	20	W
F2W3	W	Controller	20	W
F2W4	W	Machinist	15	W
F3M1	W	Manager	60	M
F3W1	W	Dresser	20	W
F3W2	W	Machinist	20	W
F3W3	W	Ironing	20	W
F3W4	W	Ironing	20	W
F4M1	M	Manager	45	M
F4W1	W	Dresser	45	W
F4W2	W	Ironing	45	W
F4W3	W	Machinist	45	W
F4W4	M	N/A	20	W
F5M1	M	Manager	30	M
F5W1	W	N/A	25	W
F5W2	M	N/A	15	W
F5W3	W	Machinist	25	W
F6M1	M	Manager	30	M
F6W1	W	Machinist	15	W
F6W2	M	Machinist	20	W
F6W3	M	Machinist	15	W
F7M1	M	Manager	20	M
F7W1	W	Machinist	20	W
F7W2	W	Machinist	40	W
F7W3	M	N/A	20	W
F8M1	M	N/A	20	M
F8W1	W	N/A	20	W
F8W2	W	N/A	20	W

We used a two-stage sampling approach. Fifty factories were initially approached for the survey. Sixteen of these factories could not or would not participate in the survey. We replaced each of these factories with a similar factory (same size, same city). We reached out to a total of 85 factories to reach the desired sample size (for a total of 35 refusals). Appendix Table A2 provides a comparison of the population of factories eligible for the survey, the factories that were sampled (original sample plus replacements), the factories that participated, and those that were sampled but did not participate. Comparing those that participated with those that did not, we observe balance between the final sample and all factories in the gender composition of the factory (percent women), percent production for the buyer, and type of factory/supplier. Surprisingly, a lower percentage of factories that participated had an ‘A’ compliance ranking (76%) compared with those that did not participate (91%) (this difference is statistically significant $p=0.08$).¹⁵ We also observe more factories with short relationships not participating, and more factories that were designated a ‘priority,’ although neither of these differences are statistically significant. Despite these minor differences, this analysis indicates the final sample was representative of adult workers in Moroccan factories with over 60 workers in these two cities.

Table A2: Factory-Level Sample Representativeness

Variable	All	Sampled	Participated	Refused/Unable	p
Casablanca	0.23	0.29	0.24	0.35	0.27
Tanger	0.77	0.71	0.76	0.65	0.27
Percent Female Workers	0.62	0.66	0.65	0.67	0.64
Percent Production Inditex	0.64	0.68	0.67	0.69	0.80
Compliance Rank A	0.80	0.82	0.76	0.91	0.08
Compliance Rank B	0.19	0.18	0.24	0.09	0.08
One year or less	0.11	0.11	0.08	0.15	0.34
1 to 3 yr relationship	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.41
More than 3 yr relationship	0.84	0.88	0.90	0.85	0.52
Factory	0.25	0.23	0.24	0.21	0.72
Supplier	0.75	0.77	0.76	0.79	0.72
Priority	0.39	0.37	0.32	0.44	0.26
Observations	257	84	50	34	

Note: p value from test of the difference between Participated and Refused/Unable

Within each factory, we took a random sample of workers who were engaged in production

¹⁵Note that we do not include number of employees because the probability of being sampled is proportional size (allowing us to take the same size sample for each factory). Therefore, we have more large factories by design.

on the day of the survey. The sampling frame only included workers 18 years or older (it is legal in Morocco for factories to employ workers under 18, but we did not have ethical protocols in place to include minors in the study). We chose to sample workers from the factory floor, not from the payroll, to ensure that all production workers were included, even those who might not be formally on the payroll.

The samples within each factory were stratified by department (sewing, cutting, etc.) and gender. When the survey team entered the factory, the survey lead asked management to name each of the factory's production areas and to provide the number of workers of each gender in each area. The survey lead then calculated the number of workers to sample in each group, as a proportion of the total sample (50 workers). After calculating the target size for each group, the survey lead entered the production area and identified the middle of each department. Starting with the most central worker (e.g. the central worker in the center line in a sewing area), the survey lead counted off workers using a specified interval (the number of workers in the group divided by the sample size) to approximate a random sample evenly spread out in the department.

As reported in the paper, the refusal rate of the survey was extremely low. We believe it was because we had permission from management to conduct the survey. Below we provide the text of the script the survey team used to approach workers in the factories. After a worker initially agreed and was taken to the enumerators, the worker was asked for informed consent. Once with the enumerator, the median survey time was 18.8 minutes, with a mean of 25 minutes.

Excuse me. I am surveying workers in this factory as part of a research project. You have been randomly selected for possible participation — I wanted to ask if you would be interested in participating in the survey. If you decide to participate, we will go to another room. In the privacy of that room, I will ask you a series of questions. The entire process should take between 15 and 20 minutes. You will continue receiving your ordinary compensation during this time. My colleagues and I have permission from managers to conduct this survey. However, if you decide not to participate, that is also perfectly fine – it has no impact on you or any workers in the factory. Are you interested in participating in the survey? IF YES: In that case, please follow me to the interview room. IF NO: Thanks very much for your time.

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Gender	2505				
... female	1716	69%			
... male	789	31%			
Age (factor)	2505				
... 18-20	130	5%			
... 21-25	493	20%			
... 26-30	541	22%			
... 31-35	354	14%			
... 36-40	350	14%			
... 41-45	282	11%			
... 46-50	194	8%			
... 51-55	113	5%			
... 56-60	38	2%			
... 61 and older	10	0%			
Education	2505				
... No formal	400	16%			
... Primary	777	31%			
... Secondary	1070	43%			
... Vocational apprenticeship	78	3%			
... Post-secondary (vocational)	104	4%			
... Post-secondary (university)	76	3%			
Migrant status	2505				
... no	1389	55%			
... yes	1116	45%			
Spouse working	2505				
...	1400	56%			
... no	502	20%			
... yes	603	24%			
Job complexity	2505				
... do difficult jobs that require experience and skill?	1758	70%			
... do simple jobs that are good for workers just starting out?	747	30%			
Number of children	2497	1.1	1.3	0	9
Dependents in household	2505	2.6	1.7	0	13
Years of experience	2505	11	9.1	0	47

A3 Wage and Annual Earning Distributions

As described in the paper, we took steps to include realistic wages in the job descriptions, while also creating variation across jobs. We were unable to find any labor force or firm surveys that could provide systematic evidence on wage distributions, and therefore had to rely on the accounts of industry insiders and interviews to set the wages. Figure A1 reports the distributions of hourly wages and annual income in the vignettes. We used a truncated normal distribution bounded between 15 and 18, with a true mean of 15 and a standard deviation of 2.1. Using this approach to randomization, the hourly wages that were included in the job descriptions had a mean of 16.2, median of 16.1 and a standard deviation of 0.84.

As stated in the paper, to calculate annual earnings, we made three assumptions. (1) There are four regular work weeks (44 hours). (2) There are twelve weeks in the ‘low’ season. (3) There are 36 weeks in the ‘high’ season. Workers only get bonuses during the high season (200 MAD per week). We estimated the number of weeks in each category through discussions with industry insiders and by examining patterns of export data from the Moroccan garment industry.




Figure A1: Distribution of Hourly Wage and Annual Earnings

A4 Pre-Analysis Plan and Replication Archive

Before fielding the survey, we registered a pre-analysis plan (PAP) on OSF.¹⁶ We have also included a replication archive on OSF.

OSF Project Site: <https://osf.io/pdba2/>

We have followed the PAP in terms of sampling and survey design. Our main departure from the PAP was not using willingness to pay (WTP) as our main estimation approach. We explain this decision in Section A6.3. As our pre-analysis plan specified WTP, our hypotheses were stated as the differences in value of attributes. We do not report all pre-registered hypotheses tests of these differences in the paper. Instead, we report analogous hypotheses tests using marginal means (MM). Tables A7, A8, A10, and A11 complete all pre-registered hypotheses tests that were not reported elsewhere.

A5 Additional Results

¹⁶The PAP includes additional analyses that are reported in a second paper.




Figure A2: Same Hours




Figure A3: Annual Earnings




Figure A4: AMCE of Hourly Wage by Within-pair Wage Gap

Note: Each point estimates the AMCE of a one-MAD increase in hourly wage, restricting the sample to pairs with at least the indicated wage gap. Shaded area represents 95% confidence intervals with cluster-robust standard errors. The marginal utility of an additional MAD increases with the size of the wage difference, suggesting that when differences are small, workers focus more on other job attributes rather than hourly wages.




Figure A5: Marginal Means for Pairs With Wage Gap Above 13%

Note: Sample restricted to pairs where the within-pair hourly wage difference exceeds 13%. Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals with cluster-robust standard errors. The 16-17 MAD is missing as it always has a wage gap <13% with other groups. Overall, the pattern suggests that workers' preferences over non-wage attributes remain consistent regardless of the wage gap, while the wage attribute itself becomes a stronger predictor of job choice when wage differences are substantively meaningful.




Figure A6: Marginal Means by Number of Dependents

Note: The left panel shows marginal means estimated separately for workers with 0–2 dependents and workers with 3 or more dependents. The right panel shows the difference between the two groups. An omnibus test reveals no statistically significant overall difference ($F(21,14404)=0.78$, $p=0.75$).




Figure A7: Marginal Means by Single Earner with Dependents




Figure A8: Marginal Means: Gender Interacted with Respect

Table A4: Marginal Means

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	Lower CI	Upper CI
Wage	15–16	0.496	0.005	0.487	0.506
	16–17	0.495	0.006	0.483	0.506
	17–18	0.515	0.008	0.500	0.530
High	50 hours	0.502	0.006	0.490	0.513
	60 hours	0.485	0.006	0.473	0.497
	75 hours	0.513	0.006	0.501	0.524
Low	10 hours	0.487	0.006	0.476	0.499
	20 hours	0.502	0.006	0.491	0.514
	44 hours	0.511	0.006	0.499	0.522
Safety	Factory unsafe	0.451	0.006	0.439	0.462
	Factory relatively safe	0.500	0.006	0.488	0.512
	Factory very safe	0.549	0.006	0.537	0.560
Stability	Lose job at any time	0.412	0.006	0.401	0.424
	Leave and rehire	0.476	0.006	0.464	0.488
	Tend to keep jobs	0.609	0.006	0.598	0.621
Env.	Unclean/poorly ventilated	0.433	0.006	0.421	0.444
	Somewhat unclean/ventilated	0.517	0.006	0.505	0.529
	Clean/ well ventilated	0.551	0.006	0.539	0.563
Pace	Uncomfortably fast pace	0.458	0.004	0.450	0.466
	Comfortable pace	0.541	0.004	0.533	0.549
Gen.	Man	0.503	0.003	0.497	0.508
	Woman	0.494	0.006	0.482	0.506
Respect	Often disrespectful	0.407	0.006	0.395	0.418
	Usual respectful	0.471	0.006	0.460	0.483
	Always respectful	0.618	0.006	0.607	0.630
Benefits	None	0.463	0.008	0.447	0.479
	Literacy education	0.490	0.008	0.474	0.507
	Transport Subsidies	0.503	0.008	0.487	0.519
	Childcare	0.517	0.008	0.500	0.533
	Health program	0.528	0.009	0.511	0.545

Table A5: Marginal Means - Same Hours

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	Lower CI	Upper CI
Wage	15–16	0.485	0.015	0.455	0.515
	16–17	0.487	0.018	0.452	0.522
	17–18	0.548	0.024	0.500	0.595
Factory Safety	Factory unsafe	0.462	0.018	0.427	0.497
	Factory relatively safe	0.494	0.018	0.459	0.529
	Factory very safe	0.546	0.019	0.509	0.582
Job Stability	Lose job at any time	0.436	0.018	0.400	0.472
	Leave and rehire	0.484	0.018	0.449	0.518
	Tend to keep jobs	0.578	0.017	0.545	0.612
Cleanliness / Ventilation	Unclean/poorly ventilated	0.440	0.019	0.403	0.478
	Somewhat unclean/ventilated	0.512	0.018	0.476	0.548
	Clean/ well ventilated	0.547	0.018	0.511	0.583
Work Pace	Uncomfortably fast pace	0.448	0.013	0.423	0.474
	Comfortable pace	0.551	0.013	0.526	0.577
Supervisor Gender	Man	0.491	0.008	0.475	0.508
	Woman	0.520	0.020	0.481	0.559
Supervisor Respect	Often disrespectful	0.416	0.018	0.380	0.452
	Usual respectful	0.438	0.017	0.405	0.470
	Always respectful	0.651	0.018	0.616	0.686
Benefit Programs	None	0.492	0.025	0.443	0.540
	Literacy education	0.525	0.026	0.475	0.575
	Transport Subsidies	0.488	0.026	0.437	0.540
	Childcare	0.468	0.025	0.418	0.517
	Health program	0.529	0.025	0.479	0.579

Table A6: Marginal Means - Annual Earnings

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	Lower CI	Upper CI
Annual Earnings	38,600–46,050	0.482	0.007	0.469	0.495
	46,050–53,500	0.502	0.006	0.491	0.514
	53,500–60,950	0.514	0.007	0.501	0.526
	60,950–68,400	0.509	0.014	0.482	0.535
Safety	Factory unsafe	0.451	0.006	0.439	0.462
	Factory relatively safe	0.500	0.006	0.488	0.512
	Factory very safe	0.549	0.006	0.537	0.560
Stability	Lose job at any time	0.412	0.006	0.401	0.424
	Leave and rehire	0.476	0.006	0.464	0.488
	Tend to keep jobs	0.609	0.006	0.598	0.621
Env.	Unclean/poorly ventilated	0.433	0.006	0.421	0.444
	Somewhat unclean/ventilated	0.517	0.006	0.505	0.529
	Clean/ well ventilated	0.551	0.006	0.539	0.563
Pace	Uncomfortably fast pace	0.458	0.004	0.450	0.466
	Comfortable pace	0.541	0.004	0.533	0.549
Gen.	Man	0.503	0.003	0.497	0.508
	Woman	0.494	0.006	0.482	0.506
Respect	Often disrespectful	0.407	0.006	0.395	0.418
	Usual respectful	0.471	0.006	0.460	0.483
	Always respectful	0.618	0.006	0.607	0.630
Benefits	None	0.463	0.008	0.447	0.479
	Literacy education	0.490	0.008	0.474	0.507
	Transport Subsidies	0.503	0.008	0.487	0.519
	Childcare	0.517	0.008	0.500	0.533
	Health program	0.528	0.009	0.511	0.545

Table A7: Differences in Marginal Means

Feature	Contrast of Levels	Estimate	Std. Error	P-value	Lower CI	Upper CI
Wage	16–17 - 15–16	0.000	0.010	0.971	-0.018	0.019
	17–18 - 15–16	0.019	0.010	0.067	-0.001	0.039
	17–18 - 16–17	0.019	0.011	0.087	-0.003	0.040
High-Season Hours	60 hours - 50 hours	-0.012	0.010	0.243	-0.031	0.008
	75 hours - 50 hours	0.012	0.010	0.219	-0.007	0.031
	75 hours - 60 hours	0.024	0.010	0.016	0.004	0.043
Low-Season Hours	20 hours - 10 hours	0.017	0.010	0.079	-0.002	0.036
	44 hours - 10 hours	0.025	0.010	0.010	0.006	0.044
	44 hours - 20 hours	0.008	0.010	0.412	-0.011	0.027
Safety	Factory relatively safe - Factory unsafe	0.050	0.010	0.000	0.030	0.070
	Factory very safe - Factory relatively safe	0.051	0.010	0.000	0.032	0.070
	Factory very safe - Factory unsafe	0.101	0.010	0.000	0.081	0.120
Job Stability	Leave and rehire - Lose job at any time	0.063	0.010	0.000	0.043	0.083
	Tend to keep jobs - Leave and rehire	0.131	0.010	0.000	0.112	0.150
	Tend to keep jobs - Lose job at any time	0.194	0.010	0.000	0.175	0.214
Cleanliness	Clean/ well ventilated - Somewhat unclean/ventilated	0.038	0.010	0.000	0.018	0.057
	Clean/ well ventilated - Unclean/poorly ventilated	0.120	0.010	0.000	0.101	0.139
	Somewhat unclean/ventilated - Unclean/poorly ventilated	0.083	0.010	0.000	0.063	0.102
Work Pace	Comfortable pace - Uncomfortably fast pace	0.083	0.008	0.000	0.068	0.099
Supervisor Gender	Woman - Man	-0.007	0.009	0.427	-0.024	0.010
Supervisor Respect	Always respectful - Often disrespectful	0.214	0.010	0.000	0.194	0.233
	Always respectful - Usual respectful	0.148	0.010	0.000	0.129	0.167
	Usual respectful - Often disrespectful	0.066	0.010	0.000	0.047	0.086
Benefits	Childcare - Literacy education	0.027	0.013	0.035	0.002	0.052
	Childcare - None	0.054	0.013	0.000	0.029	0.079
	Childcare - Transport Subsidies	0.021	0.013	0.093	-0.004	0.046
	Health program - Childcare	0.009	0.013	0.486	-0.016	0.034
	Health program - Literacy education	0.036	0.013	0.005	0.011	0.061
	Health program - None	0.063	0.013	0.000	0.038	0.088
	Health program - Transport Subsidies	0.030	0.013	0.017	0.005	0.056
	Literacy education - None	0.027	0.012	0.030	0.003	0.051
	Transport Subsidies - Literacy education	0.006	0.013	0.659	-0.019	0.030
	Transport Subsidies - None	0.033	0.012	0.009	0.008	0.057

Note: Clustered standard errors at the worker level.

Table A8: Differences in Preferences Across Job Attributes

Hypothesis	Estimate	Std. Error	P-value	Lower CI	Upper CI
Overtime(60-50) vs Pace	-0.095	0.013	0.000	-0.120	-0.070
Overtime(75-60) vs Pace	-0.060	0.013	0.000	-0.085	-0.035
Overtime(60-50) vs Respect (Always-Never)	-0.226	0.014	0.000	-0.253	-0.198
Overtime(75-60) vs Respect (Always-Never)	-0.190	0.014	0.000	-0.218	-0.163
Overtime(60-50) vs Cleanliness (Always-Never)	-0.132	0.014	0.000	-0.159	-0.104
Overtime(75-60) vs Cleanliness (Always-Never)	-0.096	0.014	0.000	-0.124	-0.069
Overtime(60-50) vs Safety (Safe-Unsafe)	-0.113	0.014	0.000	-0.140	-0.085
Overtime(75-60) vs Safety (Safe-Unsafe)	-0.077	0.014	0.000	-0.105	-0.050
Overtime(60-50) vs Stability (Keep-Loose)	-0.206	0.014	0.000	-0.233	-0.179
Overtime(75-60) vs Stability (Keep-Loose)	-0.171	0.014	0.000	-0.198	-0.143
Pace vs Respect (Always-Never)	-0.131	0.013	0.000	-0.156	-0.105
Pace vs Cleanliness (Always-Never)	-0.037	0.013	0.005	-0.062	-0.011
Pace vs Safety (Safe-Unsafe)	-0.018	0.013	0.181	-0.043	0.008
Pace vs Stability (Keep-Loose)	-0.111	0.013	0.000	-0.137	-0.085
Cleanliness (Always-Never) vs Safety (Safe-Unsafe)	0.019	0.014	0.175	-0.009	0.047
Cleanliness (Always-Never) vs Stability (Keep-Loose)	-0.074	0.014	0.000	-0.102	-0.046
Cleanliness (Always-Never) vs Respect (Always-Never)	-0.094	0.014	0.000	-0.121	-0.066
Stability (Keep-Loose) vs Safety (Safe-Unsafe)	0.093	0.014	0.000	0.066	0.121
Stability (Keep-Loose) vs Respect (Always-Never)	-0.020	0.015	0.177	-0.048	0.009
Safety (Safe-Unsafe) vs Respect (Always-Never)	-0.113	0.014	0.000	-0.141	-0.085

Note: Clustered standard errors at the worker level.

Table A9: Marginal Means by Gender and Difference Tests

Feature	Level	Men	Women	Difference (W-M)	p-value
Wage	15–16	0.490	0.499	0.010	0.359
	16–17	0.507	0.489	-0.018	0.170
	17–18	0.510	0.517	0.007	0.653
High	50 hours	0.493	0.506	0.013	0.325
	60 hours	0.485	0.485	0.000	0.988
	75 hours	0.522	0.509	-0.013	0.303
Low	10 hours	0.488	0.487	-0.001	0.950
	20 hours	0.499	0.504	0.005	0.677
	44 hours	0.513	0.509	-0.004	0.743
Safety	Factory unsafe	0.470	0.441	-0.029	0.024
	Factory relatively safe	0.488	0.505	0.017	0.190
	Factory very safe	0.541	0.552	0.011	0.399
Stability	Lose job at any time	0.415	0.411	-0.004	0.740
	Leave and rehire	0.478	0.475	-0.003	0.816
	Tend to keep jobs	0.605	0.611	0.007	0.580
Env.	Unclean/poorly ventilated	0.430	0.434	0.004	0.779
	Somewhat unclean/ventilated	0.516	0.517	0.001	0.924
	Clean/ well ventilated	0.553	0.550	-0.004	0.767
Pace	Uncomfortably fast pace	0.463	0.456	-0.007	0.447
	Comfortable pace	0.535	0.544	0.008	0.347
Gen.	Man	0.499	0.504	0.005	0.422
	Woman	0.501	0.490	-0.011	0.414
Respect	Often disrespectful	0.424	0.398	-0.025	0.055
	Usual respectful	0.483	0.466	-0.018	0.173
	Always respectful	0.591	0.631	0.039	0.002
Benefits	None	0.479	0.456	-0.023	0.194
	Literacy education	0.478	0.496	0.018	0.299
	Transport Subsidies	0.513	0.498	-0.015	0.420
	Childcare	0.490	0.529	0.039	0.031
	Health program	0.545	0.521	-0.024	0.193

Table A10: MMs: Supervisor Gender Compared to Other Attributes (Male Workers)

Hypothesis	Estimate	Std. Error	P-value	Lower CI	Upper CI
Sup. Gender=0	0.004	0.016	0.804	-0.027	0.035
Sup. Gender vs Respect (Always-Never)	-0.166	0.024	0.000	-0.212	-0.120
Sup. Gender vs Safety (Safe-Unsafe)	-0.073	0.024	0.002	-0.119	-0.027
Sup. Gender vs Stability (Keep-Loose)	-0.182	0.023	0.000	-0.228	-0.136
Sup. Gender vs Cleanliness (Always-Never)	-0.128	0.023	0.000	-0.173	-0.083

Note: Clustered standard errors at the worker level.

Table A11: MMs: Supervisor Gender Compared to Other Attributes (Female Workers)

Hypothesis	Estimate	Std. Error	P-value	Lower CI	Upper CI
Sup. Gender=0	-0.011	0.010	0.277	-0.031	0.009
Sup. Gender vs Respect (Always-Never)	-0.247	0.016	0.000	-0.277	-0.216
Sup. Gender vs Safety (Safe-Unsafe)	-0.123	0.015	0.000	-0.153	-0.093
Sup. Gender vs Stability (Keep-Loose)	-0.210	0.016	0.000	-0.241	-0.179
Sup. Gender vs Cleanliness (Always-Never)	-0.125	0.016	0.000	-0.155	-0.094

Note: Clustered standard errors at the worker level.

Table A12: Marginal Means for Wage Levels under Alternative Binnings

Wage Level	Estimate (0.2 MAD)	SE	Estimate (0.4 MAD)	SE	Estimate (0.6 MAD)	SE
15–15.2	0.492	0.013	NA	NA	NA	NA
15–15.4	NA	NA	0.499	0.009	NA	NA
15–15.6	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.494	0.007
15.2–15.4	0.506	0.013	NA	NA	NA	NA
15.4–15.6	0.484	0.013	NA	NA	NA	NA
15.4–15.8	NA	NA	0.499	0.009	NA	NA
15.6–15.8	0.513	0.014	NA	NA	NA	NA
15.6–16.2	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.500	0.008
15.8–16	0.484	0.014	NA	NA	NA	NA
15.8–16.2	NA	NA	0.492	0.010	NA	NA
16–16.2	0.501	0.015	NA	NA	NA	NA
16.2–16.4	0.494	0.015	NA	NA	NA	NA
16.2–16.6	NA	NA	0.492	0.011	NA	NA
16.2–16.8	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.492	0.008
16.4–16.6	0.490	0.015	NA	NA	NA	NA
16.6–16.8	0.491	0.016	NA	NA	NA	NA
16.6–17	NA	NA	0.494	0.012	NA	NA
16.8–17	0.496	0.017	NA	NA	NA	NA
16.8–17.4	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.501	0.010
17–17.2	0.495	0.018	NA	NA	NA	NA
17–17.4	NA	NA	0.503	0.013	NA	NA
17.2–17.4	0.513	0.019	NA	NA	NA	NA
17.4–17.6	0.526	0.019	NA	NA	NA	NA
17.4–17.8	NA	NA	0.513	0.012	NA	NA
17.4–18	NA	NA	NA	NA	0.523	0.011
17.6–17.8	0.483	0.020	NA	NA	NA	NA
17.8–18	0.551	0.018	NA	NA	NA	NA

Table A13: Marginal Means by Number of Dependents and Difference Tests

Feature	Level	Two or fewer dependents	Three or more dependents	Difference	p-value
Wage	15–16	0.498	0.494	-0.004	0.647
	16–17	0.486	0.504	0.018	0.145
	17–18	0.523	0.506	-0.016	0.280
High	50 hours	0.510	0.493	-0.017	0.153
	60 hours	0.485	0.485	-0.001	0.966
	75 hours	0.505	0.522	0.017	0.138
Low	10 hours	0.487	0.487	0.000	0.971
	20 hours	0.497	0.509	0.012	0.304
	44 hours	0.517	0.504	-0.012	0.286
Safety	Factory unsafe	0.450	0.452	0.002	0.865
	Factory relatively safe	0.507	0.492	-0.014	0.232
	Factory very safe	0.544	0.554	0.010	0.398
Stability	Lose job at any time	0.403	0.423	0.019	0.111
	Leave and rehire	0.483	0.468	-0.015	0.225
	Tend to keep jobs	0.612	0.606	-0.006	0.584
Env.	Unclean/poorly ventilated	0.432	0.434	0.003	0.828
	Somewhat unclean/ventilated	0.520	0.513	-0.007	0.558
	Clean/ well ventilated	0.548	0.554	0.006	0.594
Pace	Uncomfortably fast pace	0.456	0.460	0.003	0.683
	Comfortable pace	0.543	0.539	-0.005	0.574
Gen.	Man	0.504	0.501	-0.003	0.566
	Woman	0.491	0.498	0.007	0.566
Respect	Often disrespectful	0.406	0.408	0.002	0.871
	Usual respectful	0.478	0.464	-0.014	0.226
	Always respectful	0.613	0.625	0.012	0.293
Benefits	None	0.460	0.467	0.007	0.684
	Literacy education	0.498	0.481	-0.017	0.316
	Transport Subsidies	0.497	0.510	0.013	0.430
	Childcare	0.515	0.518	0.003	0.842
	Health program	0.532	0.524	-0.008	0.653




Figure A9: Children at Home

In our pre-analysis plan, we stated that we would also investigate differences between workers who have children at home and those that do not. We report this in Figure A9. We do not observe any such difference ($F_{21,14404}=0.80$, $p=0.73$). This analysis remains unchanged if we only include women workers—mothers with children at home do not have different preferences than other women workers, Figure A10 ($F_{21,9844}=0.86$, $p=0.65$).




Figure A10: Children at Home (Only Women Workers)




Figure A11: Migrants versus Non-Migrants

A6 Alternative Estimators

A6.1 Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE)

In addition to marginal means, an alternative approach to analyzing data from conjoint experiments is the ACME, which represents the change in the probability of a profile being selected relative to a baseline condition (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). The AMCE estimator has two useful characteristics for this analysis. First, it clearly shows the causal effect of a change in a specific job characteristics on the probability of workers preferring the job, simulating a worker navigating the job market. Second, the AMCE allows us to treat the wage variable as continuous.

In the baseline model (Table A14, Model 1), we observe that an increase in 1 MAD leads to only a 0.9 percentage point increase in the probability of workers preferring a job ($p=0.063$). The estimate only reaches 0.010 for workers with high numbers of dependents. This value increases three-fold in same hours subsample, Table A15, reaching 2.9 percentage points. This increase is substantial, but an additional MAD still does not have a large effect on worker's choices. Turning to annual earnings, a standard deviation increase in annual earnings leads only to a 1.1 percentage point increase in the probability that a worker prefers a job. Overall, these results are consistent with the MM approach reported in the main paper.

Table A14: AMCE Baseline Estimates

	Base model	Female	Male	Low dependents	High dependents
Hourly wage (1 MAD)	0.009+ (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	0.013 (0.009)	0.008 (0.006)	0.010 (0.007)
High 60 h (omit 50)	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.012)	-0.002 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.015)
High 75 h	0.012 (0.010)	0.002 (0.012)	0.033+ (0.018)	-0.002 (0.013)	0.029* (0.015)
Low 10 h (omit 20)	0.017+ (0.010)	0.017 (0.012)	0.018 (0.018)	0.012 (0.013)	0.023 (0.015)
Low 44 h	0.025* (0.010)	0.023+ (0.012)	0.029+ (0.017)	0.030* (0.013)	0.021 (0.015)
Relatively safe (omit unsafe)	0.050*** (0.010)	0.062*** (0.012)	0.024 (0.018)	0.058*** (0.014)	0.042** (0.015)
Very safe	0.101*** (0.010)	0.112*** (0.012)	0.077*** (0.018)	0.096*** (0.014)	0.108*** (0.015)
Rehire (omit any time)	0.063*** (0.010)	0.063*** (0.012)	0.064*** (0.018)	0.076*** (0.014)	0.048** (0.015)
Keep jobs	0.194*** (0.010)	0.199*** (0.012)	0.186*** (0.018)	0.206*** (0.013)	0.181*** (0.015)
Somewhat unclean (omit: Unclean)	0.083*** (0.010)	0.079*** (0.012)	0.088*** (0.018)	0.081*** (0.014)	0.084*** (0.015)
Clean	0.120*** (0.010)	0.113*** (0.012)	0.132*** (0.017)	0.118*** (0.013)	0.122*** (0.015)
Comfortable (omit: Fast)	0.083*** (0.008)	0.088*** (0.010)	0.074*** (0.015)	0.088*** (0.011)	0.077*** (0.012)
Woman (omit: Man)	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.011 (0.010)	0.004 (0.016)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.013)
Usually (omit Often disrespectful)	0.066*** (0.010)	0.071*** (0.012)	0.057** (0.018)	0.071*** (0.013)	0.061*** (0.015)
Always	0.214*** (0.010)	0.235*** (0.012)	0.170*** (0.018)	0.208*** (0.013)	0.221*** (0.015)
Literacy (omit: No benefit)	0.027* (0.012)	0.043** (0.015)	-0.005 (0.022)	0.039* (0.017)	0.013 (0.018)
Transport	0.033** (0.012)	0.038* (0.015)	0.023 (0.023)	0.034* (0.017)	0.030 (0.018)
Childcare	0.054*** (0.013)	0.076*** (0.015)	0.009 (0.023)	0.057*** (0.017)	0.048* (0.019)
Health program	0.063*** (0.013)	0.064*** (0.015)	0.064** (0.023)	0.068*** (0.017)	0.056** (0.019)
Constant	-0.034 (0.080)	-0.029 (0.096)	-0.059 (0.145)	-0.020 (0.108)	-0.045 (0.120)
Num.Obs.	14446	9886	4560	7738	6708

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondent.

Table A15: AMCE Estimates: Earnings Related Models

	Same hours	Annual wage	Annual earnings (same hours)
Hourly wage (1 MAD)	0.029+ (0.015)		
Annual Earnings (Std)		0.011** (0.004)	0.008 (0.005)
Relatively safe (omit unsafe)	0.030 (0.030)	0.050*** (0.010)	0.032 (0.030)
Very safe	0.081** (0.030)	0.101*** (0.010)	0.079** (0.030)
Rehire (omit any time)	0.050+ (0.030)	0.063*** (0.010)	0.049 (0.030)
Keep jobs	0.133*** (0.030)	0.194*** (0.010)	0.132*** (0.030)
Somewhat unclean (omit: Unclean)	0.077* (0.032)	0.082*** (0.010)	0.077* (0.032)
Clean	0.104** (0.032)	0.120*** (0.010)	0.102** (0.032)
Comfortable (omit: Fast)	0.091*** (0.025)	0.084*** (0.008)	0.090*** (0.025)
Woman (omit: Man)	0.020 (0.028)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.019 (0.028)
Usually (omit Often disrespectful)	0.022 (0.030)	0.066*** (0.010)	0.022 (0.030)
Always	0.225*** (0.031)	0.214*** (0.010)	0.225*** (0.031)
Literacy (omit: No benefit)	0.045 (0.037)	0.027* (0.012)	0.043 (0.037)
Transport	-0.012 (0.040)	0.033** (0.012)	-0.015 (0.040)
Childcare	-0.014 (0.039)	0.054*** (0.013)	-0.015 (0.039)
Health program	0.044 (0.039)	0.063*** (0.013)	0.045 (0.039)
Constant	-0.273 (0.252)	0.125*** (0.014)	0.200*** (0.045)
Num.Obs.	1498	14446	1498

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondent.

A6.2 Average Component Preference (ACP)

Another approach to estimating preferences using data generated from a conjoint experiment is that ACP, which is the probability that a profile with an attribute will be selected compared to a profile without that attribute (Ganter 2021). As the coefficients are shifted by 0.5, a negative value implies less than 50% and a positive more. Similar to the MM estimator, this approach requires us to treat wages as a factor variable. The results, in Table A16, present the ACP estimates (the statistical significance is in relation to indifference to the attribute, or a value of 0). The results closely mirror the MM estimates. For example, the difference in the probability of a worker selecting a job with an ‘always respectful’ supervisor (0.179) and ‘disrespectful’ supervisor (-0.135) is 31.4 percentage points. The results also show similar differences between men and women in terms of respectful workplaces.

Table A16: ACP Estimates

	Base	Female	Male	0-2 dep.	3+ dep.
Wage 15-16 MAD	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.012)
Wage 16-17 MAD	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.018 (0.011)	0.005 (0.017)	-0.021* (0.013)	0.001 (0.014)
Wage 17-18 MAD	0.019* (0.010)	0.023* (0.012)	0.011 (0.018)	0.029** (0.014)	0.008 (0.015)
High-season 50 h	0.003 (0.009)	0.009 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.016)	0.014 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)
High-season 60 h	-0.022** (0.009)	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.021 (0.013)
High-season 75 h	0.019** (0.009)	0.013 (0.011)	0.034** (0.015)	0.008 (0.012)	0.031** (0.013)
Low-season 10 h	-0.019** (0.009)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.013)
Low-season 20 h	0.003 (0.009)	0.005 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.014 (0.013)
Low-season 44 h	0.016* (0.009)	0.014 (0.011)	0.020 (0.014)	0.025** (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)
Unsafe	-0.075*** (0.009)	-0.087*** (0.011)	-0.046*** (0.016)	-0.076*** (0.012)	-0.074*** (0.013)
Relatively safe	-0.001 (0.009)	0.006 (0.010)	-0.019 (0.016)	0.008 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)
Very safe	0.076*** (0.009)	0.080*** (0.011)	0.065*** (0.016)	0.068*** (0.012)	0.084*** (0.013)
Lose any time	-0.130*** (0.009)	-0.132*** (0.011)	-0.124*** (0.016)	-0.147*** (0.012)	-0.110*** (0.013)
Rehire	-0.037*** (0.009)	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.037** (0.015)	-0.028** (0.012)	-0.048*** (0.013)
Keep jobs	0.167*** (0.008)	0.170*** (0.010)	0.161*** (0.015)	0.175*** (0.012)	0.158*** (0.012)
Unclean	-0.101*** (0.009)	-0.099*** (0.011)	-0.104*** (0.015)	-0.103*** (0.012)	-0.098*** (0.013)
Somewhat unclean	0.024*** (0.009)	0.024** (0.011)	0.025 (0.016)	0.029** (0.012)	0.018 (0.013)
Clean	0.076*** (0.009)	0.075*** (0.011)	0.079*** (0.015)	0.073*** (0.012)	0.080*** (0.013)
Uncomfortably fast	-0.084*** (0.008)	-0.089*** (0.010)	-0.072*** (0.016)	-0.087*** (0.011)	-0.080*** (0.012)
Comfortable pace	0.084*** (0.008)	0.089*** (0.010)	0.072*** (0.016)	0.087*** (0.011)	0.080*** (0.012)
Gen: Man	0.009 (0.009)	0.014 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.016)	0.014 (0.012)	0.004 (0.014)
Gen: Woman	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.014 (0.011)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.014)
Disrespectful	-0.135*** (0.009)	-0.147*** (0.010)	-0.111*** (0.015)	-0.140*** (0.012)	-0.130*** (0.013)
Usually respectful	-0.043*** (0.009)	-0.051*** (0.011)	-0.026 (0.016)	-0.031*** (0.012)	-0.057*** (0.013)
Always respectful	0.179*** (0.008)	0.198*** (0.010)	0.137*** (0.016)	0.171*** (0.012)	0.187*** (0.012)
No benefits	-0.048*** (0.010)	-0.057*** (0.012)	-0.027 (0.018)	-0.052*** (0.014)	-0.041*** (0.015)
Literacy	-0.012 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.028 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.023 (0.015)
Transport	0.004 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.013)	0.013 (0.019)	-0.004 (0.015)	0.012 (0.015)
Childcare	0.021** (0.010)	0.036*** (0.013)	-0.013 (0.019)	0.019 (0.014)	0.022 (0.015)
Health programme	0.035*** (0.011)	0.027** (0.013)	0.056*** (0.019)	0.040*** (0.015)	0.029* (0.016)
Num. Obs.	14446	9886	4560	7738	6708

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$

A6.3 Willingness to Pay Analysis

In accordance with the pre-analysis plan, we report estimates from a willingness-to-pay (WTP) analysis (McFadden 1974). As described in the main text, these results are presented in the Appendix due to unanticipated complications encountered during estimation. After fielding the survey, we identified an issue arising from inclusion of the combination of wages/hours and annual earnings in the job descriptions. While this design aimed to improve the realism and clarity of the jobs, it likely attenuated the estimated coefficient on hourly wages. Because WTP calculations use the hourly wages, a downwardly biased wage coefficient results in inflated WTP values for non-wage attributes.

We report the WTP estimates for completeness and transparency. Our primary results are presented in Table A17. The models are estimated in WTP space via maximum simulated likelihood, a technique developed by Train and Weeks (2005). Estimation procedures are implemented using the computational routine provided by Helveston (2023). With the exception of the scale parameter, all coefficients reported in Table A17 can be interpreted as the average monetary value, expressed in terms of MAD, workers assign to specific non-wage job characteristics. Model 1 in Table A17 presents the results of a multinomial logit model, which assumes homogeneity in respondent preferences.

Table A17: Multinomial (MNL) and Mixed (MIX) Logit in WTP
Space: Maximum Likelihood Estimation

	MNL: Full Sample	MNL: Same Hours	MIX: Full sample
Scale parameter (Wage)	−0.04*	−0.13*	−0.04
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Safety: Factory relatively safe	−6.51*	−1.84	−8.94
	(3.95)	(1.48)	(8.40)
Safety: Factory very safe	−12.48*	−3.33*	−16.84
	(7.32)	(2.00)	(15.43)
Stability: Leave and rehire	−7.35*	−1.68	−10.35
	(4.44)	(1.35)	(9.65)
Stability: Tend to keep jobs	−23.45*	−5.69*	−32.53
	(13.69)	(3.15)	(30.12)

	MNL: Full Sample	MNL: Same Hours	MIX: Full sample
Environment: Somewhat unclean	-9.72* (5.78)	-2.11 (1.57)	-13.08 (12.13)
Environment: Clean and ventilated	-14.84* (8.68)	-3.40* (2.03)	-21.37 (19.68)
Pace: Comfortable pace	-10.45* (6.13)	-3.60* (2.08)	-14.37 (13.60)
Gender of supervisor: Woman	0.62 (1.09)	-0.93 (1.09)	1.75 (2.12)
Respect: Usually respectful	-7.83* (4.63)	-0.66 (1.22)	-10.64 (9.74)
Respect: Always respectful	-25.75* (14.98)	-8.11* (4.37)	-37.05 (34.60)
Benefit: Literacy education	-4.04 (2.77)	-1.31 (1.55)	-5.60 (5.70)
Benefit: Transport subsidies	-5.02 (3.31)	0.58 (1.50)	-6.96 (7.04)
Benefit: Childcare	-7.20 (4.48)	0.64 (1.45)	-9.11 (8.76)
Benefit: Health program	-8.65 (5.31)	-1.86 (1.77)	-11.38 (10.95)
High hours: 60 hours	1.67 (1.53)		2.70 (3.01)
High hours: 75 hours	-1.48 (1.43)		-3.11 (3.32)
Low hours: 20 hours	-2.03 (1.63)		-3.10 (3.26)
Low hours: 44 hours	-2.65 (1.87)		-4.36 (4.36)
SD: Safety: Factory relatively safe			8.23 (13.69)
SD: Safety: Factory very safe			-22.17 (21.86)
SD: Stability: Leave and rehire			-17.27

	MNL: Full Sample	MNL: Same Hours	MIX: Full sample
			(16.12)
SD: Stability: Tend to keep jobs			24.85
			(23.73)
SD: Environment: Somewhat unclean			4.26
			(11.89)
SD: Environment: Clean and ventilated			−13.80
			(14.80)
SD: Pace: Comfortable pace			−20.49
			(19.34)
SD: Gender of supervisor: Woman			9.03
			(11.95)
SD: Respect: Usually respectful			3.12
			(35.40)
SD: Respect: Always respectful			−28.01
			(27.80)
SD: Benefit: Literacy education			−6.31
			(7.24)
SD: Benefit: Transport subsidies			22.98
			(20.73)
SD: Benefit: Childcare			−14.41
			(18.92)
SD: Benefit: Health program			20.32
			(19.23)
SD: High hours: 60 hours			1.10
			(8.36)
SD: High hours: 75 hours			−0.65
			(5.61)
SD: Low hours: 20 hours			−10.16
			(14.98)
SD: Low hours: 44 hours			4.95
			(10.80)
Num. obs.	7223	749	6780
Log Likelihood	−4343.68	−451.70	−4051.93

	MNL: Full Sample	MNL: Same Hours	MIX: Full sample
AIC	8725.36	933.41	8177.85
BIC	8856.17	1002.69	8430.25

With the exception of the scale parameter, all coefficients represent the value for the corresponding attribute, expressed in Moroccan Dirhams (MAD). We run the minimization of the negative log-likelihood function 500 times from 500 different sets of random starting points. This is recommended as WTP space models have a non-convex log-likelihood function and thus could have multiple local minima. Clustered standard errors at the worker level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. The “Same Hours” specification includes only job choices where both options involved the same number of working hours. The MXL model includes fewer observations because estimating using (Helveston 2023) requires each worker to evaluate the same number of choice tasks, which reduces the effective sample size relative to the MNL model. In the MXL model we allow coefficients for all job attributes to vary normally. While the coefficient for the wage coefficient is specified to be fixed across all observations. Each observation corresponds to a pairwise job comparison.

Two notable patterns emerge from the estimates in Model 1. First, the coefficient on hourly wage is small and only marginally statistically significant ($p = 0.085$), indicating that workers have limited preferences for higher hourly wages. Second, the implied WTP for several non-wage job attributes appears extremely high. Estimates suggest that workers are on average willing to forgo more than half (for childcare) or even all of their hourly wage (respectful treatment), for certain job attributes. We believe these WTP estimates should therefore be interpreted with caution.

Using the same approach as in the main text to better isolate preferences for hourly wages, Model 2 estimates WTP using a multinomial logit using only job pairs with identical working hours. As expected, this restriction increases the magnitude of the scale parameter (by a factor of three), resulting in more moderate WTP estimates. For instance, Model 2 indicates that workers are willing to accept a wage reduction of up to 1.84 MAD for employment in a relatively safe factory versus an unsafe one, and 0.64 MAD for a factory offering childcare. Notably, and consistent with the findings reported in the main text, WTP values for many non-wage attributes remain very large. The average worker is willing to forgo approximately 50% of their hourly wage to work under a respectful supervisor and around one-third for a stable job. Thus, although this evidence is consistent with our claims, we remain cautious in interpreting these estimates that may still be biased.

Finally, following the pre-analysis plan, Model 3 presents estimates from a mixed logit model, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity across individual preferences (Hole and Kolstad

2012).¹⁷ The results largely mirror those from the multinomial logit in Model 1: respondents report very high and imprecise willingness-to-pay values for most non-wage attributes.

Across all specifications in Table A17, non-wage attributes achieve at most marginal significance, as standard errors remain large throughout. We attribute this imprecision to the WTP-space parametrization: because all attribute coefficients are scaled by the wage parameter, and this parameter is small (≈ -0.04) and itself only marginally significant, the standard errors of the rescaled coefficients are mechanically inflated.

Table A18 reports estimates from the multinomial and mixed logit models specified in preference space, where coefficients are expressed in utility units and no rescaling by the wage parameter is required. All attributes not linked to annual wages (hours and hourly wage) are precisely estimated and significant at the 1% level, confirming that the imprecision in WTP space is likely to reflect a parametrization problem.

As a further robustness check, Tables A19 and A20 compare WTP estimates derived from the WTP-space models with those implied by the preference-space models. The two approaches yield substantially consistent results: in both cases, the wage coefficient is small and only marginally significant, and the implied WTP for several non-wage attributes remains implausibly high.

Table A18: Conditional and Mixed Logit in Preference space

	MNL: Pref	MXL: Pref
Wage	0.04*	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.03)
Safety: Factory relatively safe	0.25***	0.38***
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Safety: Factory very safe	0.48***	0.71***
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Stability: Leave and rehire	0.28***	0.45***
	(0.05)	(0.08)
Stability: Tend to keep jobs	0.91***	1.37***

¹⁷Consistent with established practices in the empirical literature, Model 3 specifies the random coefficients associated with individual job attributes as normally distributed, while the coefficient on wages is held fixed (Gutsche and Ziegler 2019, Hensher, Shore, and Train 2005).

	MNL: Pref	MXL: Pref
	(0.05)	(0.12)
Environment: Somewhat unclean	0.38***	0.54***
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Environment: Clean and ventilated	0.58***	0.82***
	(0.05)	(0.09)
Pace: Comfortable pace	0.41***	0.58***
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Gender of supervisor: Woman	−0.02	−0.08
	(0.04)	(0.06)
Respect: Usually respectful	0.30***	0.39***
	(0.05)	(0.07)
Respect: Always respectful	1.00***	1.54***
	(0.05)	(0.13)
Benefit: Literacy education	0.16***	0.21**
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Benefit: Transport subsidies	0.20***	0.29***
	(0.06)	(0.09)
Benefit: Childcare	0.28***	0.39***
	(0.06)	(0.09)
Benefit: Health program	0.34***	0.48***
	(0.06)	(0.09)
High hours: 60 hours	−0.06	−0.11
	(0.05)	(0.07)
High hours: 75 hours	0.06	0.12*
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Low hours: 20 hours	0.08*	0.13*
	(0.04)	(0.07)
Low hours: 44 hours	0.10**	0.19***
	(0.04)	(0.07)
SD: Safety: Factory relatively safe		−0.26
		(0.32)
SD: Safety: Factory very safe		0.93***
		(0.20)

	MNL: Pref	MXL: Pref
SD: Stability: Leave and rehire		0.58** (0.24)
SD: Stability: Tend to keep jobs		-1.04*** (0.21)
SD: Environment: Somewhat unclean		-0.25 (0.32)
SD: Environment: Clean and ventilated		-0.57* (0.31)
SD: Pace: Comfortable pace		0.77*** (0.18)
SD: Gender of supervisor: Woman		-0.48** (0.24)
SD: Respect: Usually respectful		0.56 (0.35)
SD: Respect: Always respectful		1.23*** (0.18)
SD: Benefit: Literacy education		0.28 (0.28)
SD: Benefit: Transport subsidies		-1.02*** (0.24)
SD: Benefit: Childcare		0.68** (0.28)
SD: Benefit: Health program		-0.86*** (0.22)
SD: High hours: 60 hours		-0.16 (0.29)
SD: High hours: 75 hours		0.04 (0.18)
SD: Low hours: 20 hours		0.54*** (0.20)
SD: Low hours: 44 hours		0.13 (0.22)
Num. obs.	7223	6780

	MNL: Pref	MXL: Pref
Log Likelihood	-4343.68	-4050.77
AIC	8725.36	8175.54
BIC	8856.17	8427.94

Clustered standard errors at the worker level in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.1$. All coefficients are expressed in units of utility. We run the minimization of the negative log-likelihood function 500 times from 500 different sets of random starting points.

Table A19: Comparison of MNL estimates: Preference Space vs WTP Space

Attribute	pref	wtp	difference
Scale parameter (Wage)	-0.04	-0.04	0.00
Safety: Factory relatively safe	-6.59	-6.51	0.08
Safety: Factory very safe	-12.65	-12.48	0.16
Stability: Leave and rehire	-7.43	-7.35	0.08
Stability: Tend to keep jobs	-23.74	-23.45	0.29
Environment: Somewhat unclean	-9.83	-9.72	0.12
Environment: Clean and ventilated	-15.03	-14.84	0.19
Pace: Comfortable pace	-10.60	-10.45	0.15
Gender of supervisor: Woman	0.64	0.62	-0.02
Respect: Usually respectful	-7.93	-7.83	0.11
Respect: Always respectful	-26.06	-25.75	0.32
Benefit: Literacy education	-4.08	-4.04	0.05
Benefit: Transport subsidies	-5.11	-5.02	0.09
Benefit: Childcare	-7.29	-7.20	0.09
Benefit: Health program	-8.74	-8.65	0.09
Hours: 60	1.68	1.67	-0.01
Hours: 75	-1.50	-1.48	0.02
Hours: 20	-2.06	-2.03	0.03
Hours: 44	-2.67	-2.65	0.03
Log-likelihood	-4,343.68	-4,343.68	0.00

The table compares the willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimated using a multinomial logit model in preference space and in WTP space. In the preference space model, marginal utility coefficients are converted into monetary values by dividing each attribute coefficient by the negative of the wage coefficient (scale parameter).

Finally, following the pre-analysis plan, we report the results of a mixed logit estimated using a Hierarchical Bayesian (HB) estimation procedure (Train 2009, Baker 2023, 2014). Unlike classical maximum likelihood estimation that relies on likelihood maximization and can suffer from convergence difficulties, the HB method circumvents these issues by directly sampling from the posterior distribution of parameters, enhancing both the consistency and efficiency of the estimates.

Table A21 shows the results of our HB model estimated in preference space, along with the implied WTP values. In line with the results in Table A17, the wage coefficient is small and only marginally significant, and the implied WTP for several non-wage attributes remains implausibly high. For example, the model suggests that workers would be willing to work for little or no pay in order to secure a stable job. These findings further confirm that the conclusions discussed above are not model dependent.

Table A20: Comparison of MXL estimates: Preference Space vs WTP Space

Attribute	pref	wtp	difference
Scale parameter (Wage)	-0.04	-0.04	0.01
Safety: Factory relatively safe	-8.42	-8.94	-0.52
Safety: Factory very safe	-15.87	-16.84	-0.97
Stability: Leave and rehire	-9.95	-10.35	-0.40
Stability: Tend to keep jobs	-30.53	-32.53	-2.00
Environment: Somewhat unclean	-11.98	-13.08	-1.10
Environment: Clean and ventilated	-18.38	-21.37	-3.00
Pace: Comfortable pace	-12.97	-14.37	-1.40
Gender of supervisor: Woman	1.76	1.75	-0.01
Respect: Usually respectful	-8.61	-10.64	-2.04
Respect: Always respectful	-34.26	-37.05	-2.79
Benefit: Literacy education	-4.61	-5.59	-0.98
Benefit: Transport subsidies	-6.40	-6.96	-0.56
Benefit: Childcare	-8.80	-9.11	-0.31
Benefit: Health program	-10.69	-11.38	-0.69
Hours: 60	2.43	2.70	0.27
Hours: 75	-2.78	-3.11	-0.33
Hours: 20	-2.92	-3.10	-0.18
Hours: 44	-4.13	-4.36	-0.23
SD: Safety: Factory relatively safe	5.90	8.23	2.33
SD: Safety: Factory very safe	-20.74	-22.17	-1.43
SD: Stability: Leave and rehire	-12.90	-17.27	-4.38
SD: Stability: Tend to keep jobs	23.20	24.85	1.66
SD: Environment: Somewhat unclean	5.47	4.26	-1.21
SD: Environment: Clean and ventilated	12.72	-13.79	-26.52
SD: Pace: Comfortable pace	-17.07	-20.49	-3.42
SD: Gender of supervisor: Woman	10.78	9.03	-1.75
SD: Respect: Usually respectful	-12.45	3.12	15.57
SD: Respect: Always respectful	-27.43	-28.01	-0.58
SD: Benefit: Literacy education	-6.25	-6.31	-0.06
SD: Benefit: Transport subsidies	22.76	22.98	0.23
SD: Benefit: Childcare	-15.12	-14.41	0.71
SD: Benefit: Health program	19.27	20.32	1.06
SD: High hours: 60 hours	3.54	1.10	-2.44
SD: High hours: 75 hours	-0.92	-0.65	0.27
SD: Low hours: 20 hours	-12.03	-10.16	1.87
SD: Low hours: 44 hours	-2.97	4.95	7.92
Log-likelihood	-4,050.77	-4,051.93	-1.16

The table compares the willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimated using a multinomial logit model in preference space and in WTP space. In the preference space model, marginal utility coefficients are converted into monetary values by dividing each attribute coefficient by the negative of the wage coefficient (scale parameter).

Table A21: Hierarchical Bayesian Mixed Logit: Preferences and Implied WTP

	MIX Logit (pref space)	Implied WTP	95% CI Lower	95% CI Upper
Hourly Wage	0.044* (0.025)	—	—	—
High season hours 60	-0.065** (0.026)	1.4657	-0.5456	3.4770
High season hours 75	0.049** (0.022)	-1.1113	-2.6968	0.4742
Low season hours 20	0.120*** (0.021)	-2.7063	-5.9095	0.4970
Low season hours 44	0.125*** (0.029)	-2.8273	-6.2465	0.5918
Factory very safe	0.525*** (0.032)	-11.8522	-25.2498	1.5455
Factory relatively safe	0.267*** (0.027)	-6.0386	-12.9609	0.8838
Leave and rehire	0.285*** (0.023)	-6.4488	-13.8243	0.9267
Tend to keep jobs	0.959*** (0.047)	-21.6686	-46.1212	2.7839
Clean/ well ventilated	0.607*** (0.029)	-13.7142	-29.1899	1.7615
Somewhat unclean/ventilated	0.390*** (0.026)	-8.8188	-18.8438	1.2062
Uncomfortably fast pace	-0.452*** (0.026)	10.2168	-1.3496	21.7832
Woman	-0.033 (0.031)	0.7481	-0.8923	2.3886
Always respectful	1.066*** (0.040)	-24.0759	-51.2443	3.0925
Usual respectful	0.273*** (0.027)	-6.1584	-13.2266	0.9098
Health program	0.364*** (0.027)	-8.2207	-17.5509	1.1096
Childcare	0.306*** (0.028)	-6.9229	-14.7812	0.9354
Literacy education	0.173*** (0.027)	-3.8995	-8.5027	0.7038
Transport Subsidies	0.186*** (0.024)	-4.2077	-9.1000	0.6846
Num.Obs.	14446			

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Column 1 presents preference-space coefficients from a Bayesian mixed logit. Columns 2–4 present implied willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates with 95% confidence intervals.

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